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Abstract
The Hillary Clinton email fiasco demonstrated alarming failures in the
procedures o f the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); derelictions in
archive integrity and adequacy o f search that an internal report identified
as “longstanding, systemic weaknesses” in the FOIA. These procedural
gaps pose dire consequences for the future of the FOIA, where requesters
query incomplete archives and agencies intentionally desert their search
obligations. The abandonment of these duties necessitates that the federal
government look toward new mechanisms for access to government
records and adopt strong affirmative disclosure principles. There has been
little scholarship on the twin failures o f archive integrity and adequacy of
search, but support for increased instances of affirmative disclosure is
building. This Article progresses the argument by presenting the
country’s enduring, unheralded commitment to these principles and
makes recommendations on how to further adopt affirmative disclosure
measures.
By exploring the repeated violations of records management laws and
the judicial opinions on the application of these laws, this Article
documents how the FOIA has been undermined for decades, including
deliberate attempts by public officials, including Henry Kissinger and
Oliver North, to destroy or remove from custody records subject to the
FOIA. Adequacy of search has been a persistent problem in the present
requester-release system, as data on judicial appeals attest. These
elements form the backbone of the FOIA, and agencies abrogation of
these duties requires new ideas in providing access to government
information. This Article proposes growing the government commitment
to an informed public— a commitment that dates back the creation o f the
Federal Register and the 1813 establishment o f the Federal Depository
Library System— by increasing categories of proactively disclosed
records and information, enforcing statutory provisions on publication of
records and data hierarchies, live registries o f existing records and
implementation o f a stronger ombuds’ role. These measures would help
remedy agency reluctance to the present requester-release system and
move closer to the presumption o f openness enshrined in the 1966
passage o f the FOIA.

* Assistant Professor, Dicderieh College of Communication, Marquette University.
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In t r o d u c t io n

The email fiasco that plagued Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential
campaign originally came to light due to mishandled Freedom o f
Information Act (FOIA) requests and would ultimately uncover
malfeasance in State Department FOIA procedures. The scandal would
prove to have serious political implications, but it also exposed unsettling
lapses in an agency’s FOIA administration. An internal investigation into
the practices was largely lost in the media circus o f the 2016 presidential
campaign, but resulting reports documented a deliberate circumvention
o f records management requirements and an intentional dereliction of
search duties.1 One o f the report’s concise conclusions determined that
1. U.S. Dep’t of Stale, Office o f Inspector Gen., Evaluation o f the Department of State’s
FOIA Processes for Requests Involving the Office of the Secretary 14 (Jan. 2016),
https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/esp-16-0I.pdflhereinafter Evaluation of FOIA Processes];
U.S. Dep’t of State, Office o f Inspector Gen., Office o f the Secretary: Evaluation of Email Records
Management and Cybersecurity Requirements 42 (May 2016), https://www.stateoig.gov/
system/files/esp-16-03.pdf [hereinafter Evaluation of Email Records],
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the department’s records management and search practices demonstrated
“longstanding, systemic weaknesses.”234
These findings are deeply disturbing, as archive integrity and
adequacy o f search serve as the foundation o f the FOIA system. Without
secure, trustworthy records management and forthright search
procedures, FOIA requests can become an exercise in futility. Requesters
rely on faithful adherence to the law, yet invariably remain at a
disadvantage due to the statute’s requester-release arrangement and
adversarial nature. Ari Schwartz, former senior director o f the National
Security Council, suggested the FOIA system is tilted in favor o f the
agency, declaring a “requester’s paradox”2 exists. Those querying agency
archives rarely know definitively whether the sought record exists and as
a result are forced to trust agencies to honestly and legally execute their
statutory duties, despite ample evidence that they will act to the contrary.
Judicial recourse, particularly with regards to records o f national security
or law enforcement interests, has shown to be little respite, demonstrating
a structural preference for agency secrecy.5
In January 2016, the State Department produced an internal
investigation into the Clinton email incident.6 The candid autopsy found
that two separate FOIA requests— one from the Associated Press (AP)
and one from Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington
(CREW)— had set in motion a chain of events that would outlast the 2016
presidential election. In March 2010 and again in the summer o f 2013,
2. Evaluation of Email Records, supra note 1 (“Longstanding, systemic weaknesses
related to electronic records and communications have existed within the Office of the Secretary
that go well beyond the tenure of any one Secretary of State.”).
3. Information Policy in the 21st Century. A Review o f the Freedom o f Information Act:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on G ov’t Mgmt., Fin., and A ccountability o f the H. Comm, on G ov’t
Reform, 109th Cong. 139-40 (2005) (statement of Ari Schwartz, Associate Director, Center for
Democracy & Technology) (referring to “the ‘requester’s paradox’ — ‘how can 1know to request
a specific document, when 1 don’t even know that the document exists?”’).
4. See, e.g., Staff of H.R. Comm , on O versight and Gov ’t Reform, 1 14th C ong.,
FOIA Is Broken: A Report 39 (Comm. Print 2016), https://oversight.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/FINAL-FOIA-Report-January-2016.pdf (cataloging the failures of the
FOIA); U.S. Gov ’t A ccountability O ff., GAO-18-365, Freedom of Information Act :
A gencies A re Implementing Requirements, but A dditional Actions Are N eeded 47 (2018),
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-365 (concluding that only five of eighteen surveyed
federal agencies fully implemented the changes required by the 2016 FOIA Improvement Act on
time).
5. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom o f
Information Act, 115 Y ale L. J. 628, 672 (2005) (emphasizing judicial deference to agency
discretion when confronted with national security claims for nondisclosure); Jane E. Kirtley,
Transparency and Accountability in a Time o f Terror: The Bush Administration’s Assault on
Freedom o f Information, 11 C om m . L. & Pol ’y 479, 479 (2006) (documenting the post-9/11
evolution of national security secrecy); Christina E. Wells, “National Security ” Information and
the Freedom o f Information Act, 56 ADMIN. L. R ev . 1195, 1198 (2004).
6. Evaluation of FOIA Processes, supra note 1.
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the AP submitted FOIA requests seeking records related to Clinton’s
correspondence with aides, her calendars and emails about the Osama bin
Laden raid and NSA surveillance practices.7 Neither o f the requests
yielded a response from the State Department.8 A suspicious CREW
submitted a December 2012 FOIA request for records “sufficient to show
the number of email accounts of, or associated with, Secretary Hillary
Rodham Clinton, and the extent to which those email accounts are
identifiable as those o f or associated with Secretary Clinton.”9 The report
found that five months later, the Office o f Information Programs and
Services— the State Department bureau responsible for FOIA
compliance— replied that there were no responsive records found.
It was a third request that would prompt the flood o f media coverage
and public interest. Judicial Watch filed a FOIA request very similar to
that o f CREW seeking information on any State Department staff
member not using a state.gov email address in conducting official
department business.10 The State Department would again deny the
existence o f such accounts, and with no concrete evidence to compel
disclosure, a District Court judge would find in favor o f the government
agency.*11 Judicial Watch then filed another request for the processing
notes from the original CREW FOIA request and were again denied and
again appealed in court to no avail.12 The State Department continued to
deny a private email address was being used, and the District Court of
D.C. repeatedly affirmed these claims despite Clinton acknowledging
two years prior in a July 2014 House Select Committee on Benghazi that
she had been emailing with a private account.13
The internal investigation would document dozens o f department
staffers regularly exchanged emails with Secretary Clinton’s personal
email account, which she used for official business.14 Secretary Clinton’s
then-chief o f staff was informed o f the CREW request, but the report
concluded that it was unlikely anybody outside the FOIA office ever
considered, participated in, or reviewed the FOIA request or response

7. Steve Peoples, AP Sues State Department, Seeking Access to Clinton Records,
A ssociated P ress (Mar. II, 2015), https://www.ap.org/ap-in-the-news/20l5/ap-sues-statedepartment-seeking-access-to-clinton-records.
8. Glenn I hrush & Gabriel Debenedetti, Clinton: I Used Private Email Account fo r
‘Convenience’, Politico (last updated Mar. 10, 2015, 6:49 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/
2015/03/hillary-clinton-email-press-conference-l 15947.
9. Evaluation of FOIA Processes, supra note 1.
10. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Stale, 177 F. Supp. 3d 450, 456 (D.D.C. 2016).
11. Id.
12. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 306 F. Supp. 3d 97, 104 (D.D.C. 2018).
13. Robert O’l larrow, Jr., How Clinton's Email Scandal Took Root, Wash . Post (Mar. 27,

2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/how-clintons-email-scandal-took-root/
2016/03/27/ee301168-e 162-11 e5-846c-10191 d 1fc4ec_story.html?utm_term=.2076e0723647.
14. Evaluation of FOIA Processes, supra note 1, at 15.
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thereafter. Alarmingly, the inspector general found blatant disregard for
search procedures: “Furthermore, it does not appear that [the Office of
the Secretary and Executive Secretariat] searched any email records, even
though the request clearly encompassed emails.” 3 According to the
inspector general’s report, this was not an uncommon chain of events. In
one o f the primary findings, the report observed that State Department
offices had chronically failed to search email records,16 despite Statespecific FOIA guidelines from 2010 explicitly instructing FOIA
personnel to do so.17
Not only did the internal investigation demonstrate clear negligence
by Clinton knowingly evading her duty to abide by records management
rules— all of her emails were transmitted via a private email account, she
never set up a State Department account18— but the department
repeatedly provided intentionally misleading FOIA responses. In the
review of State Department practices, the inspector general also found
that Clinton was not the first Secretary o f State to use a private email
address. Secretary Colin Powell also conducted government work with a
personal email account, while Secretaries Madeleine Albright and
Condoleezza Rice claimed to not have used email while serving in the
role.17 John Kerry is thought to be the first Secretary o f State to rely on a
government email account.20
As use o f personal email accounts for government business became a
subject o f national interest, it became clear how common the practice
was. A review of the FBI’s investigation into Clinton’s use of a private
server showed the agency was guilty o f breaking the same policy.21 An
inspector general’s report on FBI operations documented that use of
15. Id.
16. Id. at 8-9 (“[Office of the Secretary and Executive Secretariat] rarely searched
electronic email accounts prior to 2011 and still does not consistently search these accounts, even
when relevant records are likely to be uncovered through such a search.” The offices did not
search email accounts even when a request sought all "correspondence.” ).
17. U.S. Dep’t o f State, FOIA Guidance for State Department Employees 8 (2010) (“Unless
otherwise noted in a given request, offices should conduct a search for records in any form,
including paper records, email (including email in personal folders and attachments to email), and
other electronic records on servers, on workstations, or in Department databases.”).
18. Michael S. Schmidt. Hillary Clinton Used Personal Email Account at State Dept.,
Possibly Breaking Rules, N.Y. T imes (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/
us/politics/hillary-clintons-use-of-privatc-email-al-state-department-raises-nags.html.
19. O’Harrow, .supra note 13.
20. Lisa Rein, Clinton Isn 't First Senior Government Leader to Use Personal E-Mail fo r
Official Business, Wash. Post (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/polilics/
clintons-experience-not-unique/2015/03/03/cf59747a-cle5-l Ie4-9ec2-b418f57a4a99_story.
html?utm_term=.467518a2f7a3.
21. See U.S. D ep’t of J ustice, O ffice of the Inspector G en., A Review of Various
Actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of J ustice in A dvance
of the 2016 Election 424-28 (June 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1071991/download.
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personal email accounts for government matters was a common practice
among heads of the FBI, including former Director James Comey.22
Despite campaigning on the impropriety of Clinton’s use of a private
server, news reports showed President Trump’s closest aides also used
private email accounts for government work, including Chief of Staff
Reince Priebus, chief strategist Steve Bannon, Stephen Miller, Jared
Kushner and Gary Cohn.23 Similarly, the executive branch was rife with
officials using secret email addresses during President Barack Obama’s
,
24
tenure.
The prevalence of private email usage in government operations is
nothing short of disastrous for the FOIA. Private email records are not
per se public records and require an effort on the part of a public official
to be deposited into government records repositories subject to the FOIA.
Incomplete archives result in a failed access mechanism, returning “no
responsive records” closures even when the public has knowledge of the
records, as demonstrated with Hillary Clinton’s emails. Efficacy of the
requester-release system is predicated on stable, trustworthy archives of
government records and good faith efforts in searching these archives.
The FOIA is an adversarial system,25 whereby requesters are at an
inherent information disadvantage. The requester’s paradox
acknowledges the problematic nature of blindly requesting documents
from recalcitrant agencies. Without archive integrity and adequacy of
search, requesters are placed at an unassailable disadvantage, effectively
allowing agencies to pick and choose which records to release.
This Article documents the perilous implications of what was learned
in the Clinton email scandal and how assumptions of archive integrity
and adequacy of search—the very backbone of the FOIA—are likely
significantly less sound than previously believed. Part I explores the
legislative history and theoretical underpinnings that highlight
22. Id
23. Matt Apuzzo & Maggie Haberman, At Least 6 White House Advisers Used Private
Email Accounts, N.Y. T imes (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/us/
politics/private-email-trump-kushner-bannon.html.
24. See Julian Ilattem, Former EPA Chief under Fire for New Batch o f ‘Richard Windsor ’
Emails, The H ill (May 1, 2013, 6:08 PM), http://thehill.com/regulalion/energyenvironment/297255-former-epa-chief-under-fire-for-new-batch-of-richard-windsor-emails
(reporting EPA Director Lisa Jackson used alias email accounts to communicate with non
government figures about government business); see also Obama Appointees Using Secret Email
Accounts, CBS N ews (June 4, 2013, 8:35 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ap-obamaappointees-using-secret-email-accounts/ (documenting non-public email addresses being used in
the departments of Labor, the Interior and Health and Human Services, including by Secretary of
Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius).
25. See Potter Stewart, “Or o f the Press”, 26 Hastings L.J. 631, 636 (1975)
(acknowledging the general adversarial relationship between the press and government secrecy,
and observing the press cannot be guaranteed transparency via the FOIA due to the government’s
own self-interest).
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uncertainty in federal agencies’ ability and interest in executing these
requisite duties in good faith. Part II examines the statutory provisions
and judicial interpretations o f archive integrity and adequacy o f search,
demonstrating the unsteady foundation of federal records management
law and court opinion ambivalent to breaches in archive integrity. Part III
recommends a move toward an access regime rooted in affirmative
disclosure, which would implement expectations that would make the
processes o f archiving and searching more transparent to the public. The
federal government has long been invested in the principles o f affirmative
disclosure.26 The manuscript calls on catalyzing the insights and outrage
spurred by the Clinton emails fiasco to move public access closer to the
grand ambitions of those that originally agitated for, and won, passage of
the FOIA.
I. B a c k g r o u n d

The FOIA exists as an amendment to the 1946 Administrative
Procedure Act (APA),27 a law intended to “bring uniformity and order
out o f the chaos” o f President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal expansion
o f the federal government.28 There was a great deal of enthusiasm
surrounding passage o f the APA. The president o f the American Bar
Association described it as possibly the most consequential
administrative statute since the Judiciary Act o f 1789.29 The law was
wide-ranging in its subject matter but explicitly sought to address a lack
o f access to government information.30 Despite its efforts, the APA had
26. “Affirmative disclosure” and "proactive disclosure” are often used interchangeably.
Both represent information released without a request, but affirmative disclosure generally
describes information required to be posted, while proactive disclosure is thought to refer to
posting information without a legal obligation. For the purposes of this manuscript, affirmative
disclosure is the preferred term and denotes a legal duty to release information without a request.
See U.S. Dep ’t of J ustice, Proactive Disclosures, in Department OF J ustice G uide TO THE
Freedom of Information A ct 9, 9-12, 18-19 (2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/oip/legacy/20l4/07/23/proactive-disclosurcs-2009.pdf; Memorandum for the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 26, 2009), https://www.imls.gov/
site s/default/files/presidentmemorandum620. pdf.
27. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946); Marshall .1.
Breger, The APA: An Administrative Conference Perspective, 72 V a . L. R ev. 337, 339-40 (1986).
28. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Foreword to N.Y.U., T he Federal A dministrative Procedure
A ct and the A dministrative A gencies, at v (George Warren ed., 1947).
29. See The Federal “Administrative Procedure Act" Becomes Law, 32 A.B.A. J. 377, 377
(1946) (statement of ABA President Willis Smith) (“The Administrative Procedure Act will be
not only a means of promoting the administration of justice, but it will promote better public
relations between the people and their government. For our day it is in many ways as important
as the Judiciary Act of 1789 was in the founding of the Federal Government.”).
30. Comm , on A dmin . Procedure, A dministrative Procedure in Government
A gencies, S. Doc. N o . 77-8, at 25-26 (1941) (“An important and far-reaching defect in the field
of administrative law has been a simple lack of adequate public information concerning its
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“not yet succeeded in coping with the problems created by the growth of
the agencies.”31 In relatively short order, the APA garnered criticism.32
By 1953, Harold Cross, a media lawyer and principle architect o f the
FOIA, identified the APA as deeply flawed, claiming “ [cjomplaints o f
arbitrary, capricious, and oppressive action and usurpation o f power by
the host o f administrative agencies were numerous.”33 The language of
the APA was deferential to agency secrecy, only requiring disclosure of
government records “to persons properly and directly concerned.”34
Agencies could withhold disclosure if “secrecy [was] in the public
interest,”35 if the sought records pertained “solely to the internal
management o f an agency,”36 or nondisclosure was “otherwise required
by statute.”37 Agencies were also granted broad nondisclosure authority
under a provision allowing information to “ [be] held confidential for
good cause found.”38 Cross cited was a letter from the Library of
Congress observing the law to have effectively granted agencies the
ability “to assert the power to withhold practically all the information
they do not see fit to disclose.”39 The Records Act, referred to throughout
this article as The Housekeeping Act,40 passed in 1789, included a
provision granting department heads sweeping power in determining “the
custody, use and preservation o f the records, papers and property
appertaining to it.”41 Prior to the 1935 Federal Register Act42 and the
APA, the Housekeeping Act was the prevailing standard in both
archiving and access to agency records. Notably, the Housekeeping Act
provided agencies with absolute control o f any records o f the agency’s
creation or in the agency’s possession, from origination to disposal, and
ceded no rights o f access or inspection to any individual outside o f the
substance and procedure. . . . A primary legislative need, therefore, is a definite recognition, first,
o f the various kinds or forms o f information which ought to be available and, second, of the
authority and duty of agencies to issue such information.”).
31. Robert O. Blanchard, The Moss Committee and a Federal Public Records Law (1955—
1965), at 32 (1966) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University) (on file with Syracuse
University Libraries).
32. See, e.g., Charles S. Rhyne, The Administrative Procedure Act: Five-Year Review Finds
Protections Eroded, 37 A.B.A. J. 641, 641 (1951).
33. Harold L. C ross, T he People’s R ight to Know : Legal, A ccess to P ublic Records
and P roceedings 223 (1953).
34. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 3(c), 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946).
35. Id. § 3.
36. Id.
37. Id. § 3(c).
38. Id.
39. C ross, supra note 33, at 228.
40. Records Act, ch. 14, 1 Stat. 68 (1789) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2018)).
41. John J. Mitchell, Government Secrecy in Theory and Practice: “Rules and
Regulations” as an Autonomous Screen, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 199, 199 (1958).
42. Federal Register Act, ch. 417, 49 Stat. 500 (1935).
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agency. Cross suggested that with the Housekeeping Act in effect the
only hopes for transparency were “official grace” and “non-legal
considerations.”4’ The forces behind the FOIA, namely Rep. John Moss
and, in this case, Sen. Thomas Hennings Jr., made the Housekeeping Act
the first target o f legislative activity. Congress sought to suture the
Housekeeping Act loophole with the amendment o f one sentence in

1958.44
A. Registering Agency Recalcitrance
The FOIA was thought to be a vast improvement over the APA and
Housekeeping Act. Much o f the FOIA’s allure was in its comparatively
well-defined requester-release system. The law explicitly affords non
governmental parties a right to government records and provides
remedies for aggrieved requesters. All individuals, citizen or not, are
given the right to request inspection or copy of any existing executive
department or agency record .46 Significantly, FOIA empowered
individuals by providing two avenues o f recourse for dissatisfied
requesters; one via internal administrative appeal46 and another through
federal court appeal.47
An important element o f the FOIA is the “presumption o f openness,”
a principle assuming records are prima facie publicly available. T his
flipped the burden o f proof, requiring agencies to demonstrate the
necessity of nondisclosure. According to the statute, agency records can
only be withheld when qualifying for one of nine exemptions .48 Congress
has been adamant that the FOIA is guided by the “presumption of
openness” principle .49 Federal courts have frequently recognized the
43. C ross, supra note 33, at 218 (“ In the present state o f the law the people and their organs
o f information must trust primarily to official grace as affected by reason, courtesy, the impact of
public opinion, and other non-legal considerations and. in the longer view, to remedial legislation
by Congress. As of now, in the matter o f right to inspect such records, the public and the press
have but changed their kings.”).
44. Pub. I„ No. 85-619, 72 Stat. 547 (1958) (“ This section does not authorize withholding
information from the public or limiting the availability of records to the public.”).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2018).
46. Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)(HI)(aa).
47. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
48. Id. § 552(b).
49. S. Rep. No . 89-813, at 3 (1965) (“[It is the purpose of the present bill to eliminate [APA
language], to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure.”); S. Rep. N o . 93-854, at
157-58 (1974) (“The [FO IA].. . sets out the affirmative obligation of each agency of the federal
government to make information available to the public. . . . Congress did not intend the
exemptions in the F’OIA to be used either to prohibit disclosure of information or to justify
automatic withholding of information. Rather, they are only permissive. They merely mark the
outer limits of information that may be withheld where the agency makes a specific affirmative
determination that the public interest and the specific circumstances presented dictate . . . the
information should be withheld.”); 14. Rep. N o . 104-795, at 6 (1996) (“The FOIA establishes a
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ideal.50 President Barack Obama very publicly expressed his support for
the notion,51 and Congress codified the tenet in the 2016 FOIA
amendments.52
After enactment o f the FOIA, faith in the federal government was
shaken by the events o f the Pentagon Papers and Watergate. The FOIA
was shown to be largely ineffective in EPA v. Mink,53 and future Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia penned an article calling the FOIA “a
relatively toothless beast.”34 Congress looked to strengthen the FOIA,
amending the statute in 1974 and in the process created the structure of
the contemporary FOIA. To counteract agency reticence, the
amendments included the possibility o f punishment for individuals and
agencies found to not be in compliance with the statute. Federal courts
were given the authority to issue contempt citations to responsible FOIA
personnel.55 If the court determines agency personnel “acted arbitrarily
or capriciously with respect to withholding,” they can order an
investigation into the agency’s processing o f the request and decide
whether further disciplinary action is called for.56 To fiirther encourage
use o f the law, the court has the ability to assess the requester’s attorney
fees and litigation costs to the government.57 During the debates prior to
the 1974 amendments, Sen. Bill Alexander recounted two failed FOIA
requests o f his own before declaring the new punitive measures would
“put an end to the ridiculous delays, excuses, and bureaucratic runarounds

presumptive right for the public to obtain identifiable, existing records o f Federal departments
and agencies.”); H. Rep. No . 110-45, at 2 (2007) (“This bill will restore the presumption of
disclosure.”).
50. See Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976); Nat’l Labor Relations
Bd. v. Robbins 3 ire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 220 (1978); U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters
Comm, for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755 (1989); U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor
Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 493-94 (1994).
51. Memorandum of January 21, 2009—Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,683,
4,683 (Jan. 26, 2009) (“The [FOIA] should be administered with a clear presumption: in the face
of doubt, openness prevails. . . . All agencies should adopt a presumption in favor of
disclosure . . . . The presumption of disclosure should be applied to all decisions involving
FOIA.”).
52. FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-185, 130 Stat. 538 (2016) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. fj 552(a)(8)(A)) (showing the “presumption of openness” provision is considered
synonymous with the “foreseeable harm” standard: “An agency shall withhold information under
this section only if the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected
by an exemption described in subsection (b).”).
53. 410 U.S. 73 (1973) (holding a U.S. congresswoman could not acquire information on
nuclear tests near her home state o f Hawaii due to technicalities).
54. Antonin Scalia, The Freedom o f Information Act Has No Clothes, 6 R eg. 14, 15 (1982).
55. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(G) (2018).
56. Id. § 552(a)(4)(F)(i).
57. Id. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i).
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which have denied U.S. citizens their ‘rightco to know’ and made
Americans a captive of their own Government.”'
Despite more than a decade of legislative consideration and the
construction of a rhetorically robust statute, Congress remained highly
cognizant of potential difficulties in forcing reluctant agencies into the
transparency program. The law was in large part an act of partisanship.
Early FOIA advocacy was seen as a Democratic project advanced by a
Democratic Congress and contrary to the interests of Republican
President Dwight Eisenhower.^9 Upon arrival of Democratic
administrations, John Kennedy followed by Lyndon Johnson,
Republicans, led by Illinois Rep. Donald Rumsfeld, began lining up
support for the new law and ultimately voted in favor of passage while
President Johnson was in the White House.60 The considerable gestation
period and political nature of the FOIA produced the original modern
access to government information law, but it was also a law of factional
opportunism and expediency.
Both in the build-up and early implementation of the law, resistance
was found to be wide-spread and intransigent. Rumsfeld observed strong
opposition during the hearings on the FOIA bill: “Every witness who
testified for the executive branch was against it.” 61 Sam Archibald, staff
director of the Special Subcommittee on Government information, a
group singularly responsible for the FOIA, recalled the earliest efforts of
the subcommittee found agency officials had “a less-than-friendly
attitude toward open disclosure.” 62 Rep. Moss’s subcommittee conducted
an enormous survey of agency information practices that guided their
drafting efforts, and it surfaced “government’s negative attitude toward
the people’s right to know about their government.” 63 Moss himself was
well aware of the impending difficulty in enforcing execution of the
transparency statute, and in an unusually frank conversation with
Assistant Attorney General Norbert Schlei, Moss explained the law
58. 120 Cong . Rec. S I0.001-09 (daily ed„ Oct. 7, 1974) (statement of Sen. Alexander),
reprinted in House Comm . O n Government O perations & S enate C omm . O n T he J udiciary,
94th Cong., I s t Sess., Freedom O f Information A ct & A mendments O e 1974 Source Book,
at 388 (Joint Comm. Print 1975).
59. M ichael R. Lemov, P eople’s Warrior : J ohn Moss and the Fight for Freedom of
Information and Consumer R ights 50 (2011) (depicting the Eisenhower While I louse’s battle
between the press and the Democratic Congress’s effort to pass freedom of information laws).
60. Id. at 63 (“Republican support for a freedom-of-information bill, fueled by Rumsfeld
and then Majority Leader Gerald Ford, was new. 11 was something that had been decidedly absent
during the Eisenhower administration.”).
61. Robert O. Blanchard, The Moss Committee and a Federal Public Records Law, 19551965, 115 (1966) (unpublished Ph.I). dissertation, Syracuse University).
62. Samuel J. Archibald. The Freedom o f Information Act Revisited, 39 Pub. A dmin. Rev.
311,313 (1979).
63. Id. at 314.

370

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF I.A W A PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 29

needed to be strong and explicit due to the natural reluctance o f the
executive branch in relinquishing control o f information.64
In the customary guidance for the new law, Attorney General Ramsey
Clark emphasized the law’s complexity, room for interpretation and
possible reticence from agencies. He observed that FOIA’s success would
be subject to agencies’ will: “Its efficacy is heavily dependent on the
sound judgment and faithful execution o f those who direct and administer
our agencies of Government.”65 He stressed “records management; in
seeking the adoption o f better methods o f search, retrieval, and copying;
and in . . . documentary classification” would be vital to the successful
realization of the law.66 According to Clark, President Johnson identified
“a change in Government policy and attitude” toward access to records
as a key concern in signing the FOIA into law.67
After enactment, the agency reticence became apparent. In 1972, the
Congressional Research Service published a study o f the first four years
o f FOIA administration. Rep. William Moorhead announced the findings
before the legislature, concluding, “ [I]ts shortcomings are due more to
resistance on the part o f the huge bureaucracy than to compromises which
are inherent in the legislative process which created the law.”68 One
agency was said to “keep no records and apparently have no interest in
implementing the law.”69 Another observer suggested agencies were not
merely indifferent to the FOIA but hostile.70 In the lead-up to the 1974
FOIA amendments, the Senate Judiciary Committee called “execution of
this law by ‘those who direct and administer our agencies o f
government’ . . . substantially less than ‘faithful.’”71
The FOIA lacked popularity from parties other than agencies subject
to the new law. Harold Relyea, a FOIA scholar at the Congressional
Research Service, claimed those in command never placed any internal
64. G eorge Kennedy, A dvocates of O penness: T he Freedom of Information
Movement 124-25 (1978) (stating “|m]any times information is controlled rigidly at very low
echelons in government, and the only way we can change that is to impose some requirement
under the law .. . . We cannot just continue to drift and rely on the good faith of people or the good
judgment of people who, inherently when they are in a safe spot in government, do not want to
start any controversy, and the easiest thing in the world is to sit on that information.”).
65. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Ramsey Clark for the Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies on
the Pub. Info. Section of the Admin. Procedure Act (June 1967), https://www.justice.gov/
oip/attorney-gcnerals-memorandum-public-information-section-administrative-procedure-act.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 92 Cong . R ec. H9,949 (daily ed.. Mar. 23, 1972) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
69. Id. at 9,950.
70. Harold C. Relyea, The Freedom o f Information Act a Decade Later, 39 Pub . A dmin .
Rev. 310, 311 (1979).
71. Subcomm. O n A dmin . Practice & Procedure O f T he Senate Comm . On T he
J udiciary, 93 d Cong ., 2 d Sess., Freedom of Information Act Source Book, at 1 (Comm.
Print 1974).
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emphasis on FOIA implementation. He said agencies “failed to perceive
any sense of priority or leadership on the part of the administration in
meeting their responsibilities for executing the Act.” 72 Archibald
suggested the news media’s desire for a new access to information law
was overblown as well. There was a small coterie of especially vocal
press organizations, namely the American Society of Newspaper Editors
and Sigma Delta Chi, but most news outlets and veteran journalists had
established the necessarv connections, and a law threatened their
exclusive access. 73
In cataloging access statutes from across the country and assessing the
national landscape regarding access to government information, Harold
Cross suggested the general reluctance of government to disburse records
and information to largely be vestiges of more autocratic, more secretive
governments, suggesting the executive branch’s reticence was as much
an act of inertia as anything.74 Governments, dating back to monarchies,
had never been forced to share information at the behest of constituencies
and were uncomfortable ceding such power.
Cross emphasized the necessity of mandamus in compelling
noncompliant public bodies to release appropriate records. He
underscored examples of states where the right of inspection was
theoretically absolute but fell well short in practice.77 He also highlighted
examples of state courts refusing to enforce access to records/ 6 In
delineating what is a public record. Cross surveyed existing state statutes,
concluding there was rarely a mention, and certainly no consensus, what
was to be kept, fded and retained. He suggested it would be the
responsibility of courts to make such determinations and that these
72. Relyea, supra note 70, at 310.
73. Samuel J. Archibald, The Early Years o f the Freedom o f Information Act- 1955 to
1974, 26 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol . 726, 728 (1993) (“[M]ost of the media managers early in the 1950s
were little interested in the problem of government secrecy, and even those interested were shy
about pushing legislation to overcome excessive secrecy . . . Many Washington correspondents
were little interested in opening up government information. After all, they had their sources, and
a law breaking loose government records might open their sources to competitors. And important
members o f Congress were even less interested in the public’s right to know. Congressional
leaders and ranking committee members usually got the information they wanted from the
executive branch. They had a lot of control over the purse strings and the policies o f government;
they were told what was going on.”).
74. C ross, supra note 33, at 6 (“Quite largely, and to degrees which vary among the states,
it is what it is today because of what it was on many yesterdays. It is in a condition of cultural
lag—the captive of common law rules adopted when the courts, as part of the regalia of
government, were concerned with the prerogatives of the king, his ministers and minions, rather
than with the small affairs of his subjects; when there were few contacts between government and
subject and still fewer which required or were susceptible of written records; when ritualistic
adherence to legalism was an end in itself.”).
75. Id. at 7.
76. Id. at 8.
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determinations consistently deferred to government secrecy.77 Cross’s
1953 study o f the U.S. access to records landscape left him highly attuned
to how power abuses and undermines strong statutes. He insisted on
stable records custodianship, assuming all modem record-keeping
included salaried custodial officers.78 Cross called for the people’s right
to know to be recorded in detail and not to assume good faith.
Scholars, including Cross, and Congress documented an acute
awareness o f the difficulties in implementing new government
transparency measures, and, in particular, the improbability o f imposing
what were radical new access requirements on unwilling federal agencies.
The movement that spawned the FOIA was founded in response to
government reticence to releasing records and information. Yet, the
government failed to address crucial elements o f the requester release
system they put in place. Much time was spent determining the number
and nature o f the exemptions, the appeals process and the administration
o f fees, but to date Congress has failed to adequately define “search,” nor
address archive expectations. As a result, the archive integrity and
adequacy o f search remain unsteady elements o f the law.
B. Failures o f the FOIA & a Future o f Affirmative Disclosure
There has been a significant amount o f research exploring the history,
use and implementation o f the FOIA; a great deal o f it exemplary and
illustrative. By and large, this scholarship has been critical in nature,
finding fault in the execution o f the law, disappointment in the judicial
interpretations and prescriptive in conclusion. Much o f the preceding
scholarship has highlighted glaring issues and presaged legislative
change. Generally, FOIA scholarship has also been relatively constrained
to a narrow band o f denial and delay issues and limited to remedying how
agencies fail specific statutory provisions but rarely consider broader
structural failures that have left the mechanism sclerotic and unreliable.
A disproportionate amount o f the research has explored the use o f
statutory exemptions and common rationales for denials. Despite it
accounting for less than one percent o f all exemption claims in recent
years, significant scholarly attention has been given to Exemption 180 and

77. Id. at 39 (“[The laws’] stark brevity leaves wide scope for judicial construction.”).
78. Id. at 6.
79. Id. at 42 (“ the overall statutory picture indicates a need in many jurisdictions for
definition for inspection purposes that is based on the right of the people to know what their public
servants have actually done whether or not some particular statute requires the keeping,
preservation, filing or what not of a written record of what they have done.”).
80. See, e.g., Susan N. Mart & Tom Ginsburg, [Dis-JInforming the People’s Discretion:
Judicial Deference Under the National Security Exemption o f the Freedom o f Information Act, 66
A dmin. L. Rev. 725 (2014); Derigan A. Silver, National Security and the Press: The
Government’s Ability to Prosecute Journalists fo r the Possession or Publication o f National
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the themes of national security and terror in nondisclosure. Law
enforcement and its corollary nondisclosure provision, Exemption 7,
have garnered a tremendous amount of interest. A considerable amount
of scholarship has considered the exemptions for commercial
information83 and intra-agency communications.84 Exemption 3, the
malleable provision excluding a wide and varying range of records, has
also garnered significant scholarly attention.83 The conflict between
privacy and government transparency and the myriad ways privacy has
evolved as a nondisclosure justification has been an enduring point of
interest among FOIA scholars.86 Other persistent subjects have included
Security Information, 13 C omm . L. & Pol’y 447 (2008); Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and
the Limits o f National Security Litigation, 75 G eo. Wash . L. Rev. 1249 (2007).
81. See, e.g., Jane. E. Kirtley, Transparency and Accountability in a Time o f Terror: The
Bush Administration’s Assault on Freedom o f Information, 11 C omm . L. & Pol ’y 479 (2006);
Lotte E. Feinberg, FOIA, Federal Information Policy, and Information Availability in a Post-9/11
World, 2 1 Gov. Info. Q. 439 (2004).
82. See, e.g., Scott A. Hartman, Privacy, Personhood, and the Courts: FOIA Exemption
7(C) in Context, 120 Ya l e L.J. 379 (2010); Richard A. Kaba, Threshold Requirements fo r the FBI
Under Exemption 7 o f the Freedom o f Information Act, 86 MICHIGAN L. Rev. 620 (1987); Orin
G. Hatch, Balancing Freedom o f Information with Confidentiality fo r Law Enforcement, 9 J.
C ontemp. L. 1 (1983); Larry P. Ellsworth, Amended Exemption 7 o f the Freedom o f Information
Act, 25 A m . U.L. Rev . 37 (1975).
83. See, e.g., Samuel L. Zimmerman, Understanding Confidentiality: Program
Effectiveness and the Freedom o f Information Act Exemption 4, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1087
(2011); Patrick Lightfoot, Waiving Goodbye to Nondisclosure Under FOIA ’s Exemption 4: The
Scope and Applicability o f the Waiver Doctrine, 61 C ath. U. L. Rev. 807 (2011); Kathleen V.
Radez, The Freedom o f Information Act Exemption 4: Protecting Corporate Reputation in the
Post-Crash Regulatory Environment, 2010 COLUM. Bus. L. Rev . 632 (2010); Charles N. Davis,
A Dangerous Precedent: The Influence o f Critical Mass III on Exemption 4 o f the Federal
Freedom o f Information Act, 5 Comm . L. & Pol ’y 182 (2000); Russell B. Stevenson, Protecting
Business Secrets Under the Freedom o f Information Act: Managing Exemption 4, 34 A dmin. L.
R ev. 207 (1982).
84. See, e.g., Amanda M. Swain, Trentadue v. Integrity Committee: An Attempt to Reign in
the Expansion o f the Freedom o f Information Act's 5th Exemption, 61 O kla. L. R ev. 371 (2008);
Michael N. Kennedy, Escaping the Fishbowl: A Proposal to Fortify the Deliberative Process
Privilege, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev . 1769 (2005).
85. See, e.g., Benjamin W. Cramer. Old Love fo r New Snoops: How Exemption 3 o f the
Freedom o f Information Act Enables an Irrebuttable Presumption o f Surveillance Secrecy, 23
C omm . L. & POL’Y 91 (2018); Cordell A. Johnston, Greentree v. United States Customs Services:
A Misinterpretation o f the Relationship between FOIA Exemption 3 and the Privacy Act, 63 B.U.
L. Rev. 507(1983).
86. See, e.g.. Martin E. Ilalstuk, Benjamin W. Cramer & Michael D. Todd, Tipping the
Scales: I low the U.S. Supreme Court Eviscerated Freedom o f Information in Favor o f Privacy, in
T ransparency 2.0 16 (Charles N. Davis & David Cuillier eds., 3d ed., 2014); Marlin E. Ilalstuk
& Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom o f Information Act 1966-2006: A Retrospective on the Rise
o f Privacy Protection over the Public Interest in Knowing What the Government's Up To, 11
C omm . L. & Pol’y 511 (2006); Charles N. Davis, Electronic Access to Information and the
Privacy Paradox, 21 Soc. Sci. Computer Rev. 15 (2003); Michael Hoefges, Martin E. Ilalstuk
& Bill F. Chamberlin, Privacy Rights versus FOIA Disclosure Policy. The “Uses and Effects”
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costs and resources of the FOIA,87 judicial deference to secrecy,88
problematic agencies like the CIA,89 the advent of off-statute
nondisclosure rationales,90 the general impact of amendments91 and a
broad collection of general critiques and historical appraisals.92
Double Standard in Access to Personally-ldentifiable Information in Government Records, 12
Wm. & Mary Bill Rts . J. 12 (2003); Matthew D. Bunker & Charles N. Davis, Privatized
Government Functions and Freedom o f Information: Public Accountability in an Age o f Private
Governance, 75 JOURNALISM & Mass Comm . Q. 464 (1998); Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to
Privacy and the Public’s Right to Know: The “Central Purpose ” o f the Freedom o f Information
Act, 46 A dmin. L. R ev . 41 (1994).
87. See, e.g., Stephanie Alvarez-Jones, “Too Big to FOIA”: How Agencies Avoid
Compliance with the Freedom o f Information Act, 39 Cardozo L. Rev . 1055 (2017); A.J.
Wagner, Essential or Extravagant: Considering FOIA Budgets, Costs and Fees, 34 Gov. Info.
Q. 388 (2017); Eric J. Sinrod, Freedom o f Information Act Response Deadlines: Bridging the Gap
Between Legislative Intent and Economic Reality, 43 A m. U. L. Rev . 325 (1993).
88. See, e.g., Margaret B. Kwoka, Deference, Chenery, and FOIA, 73 Maryland L. Rev.
1060 (2014); Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. Rev . 185 (2013).
89. See, e.g., Amy E. Rees, Recent Developments Regarding the Freedom o f Information
Act: A “Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy: Or, Perhaps Both,” 44 Duke L.J. 1183 (1995); Brent
Filbert, Freedom o f Information Act: CIA v. Sims - The CIA Is Given Broad Powers to Withhold
the Identities o f Intelligence Sources, 54 UMKC L. Rev. 332 (1986); Gregory G. Brooker, FOIA
Exemption 3 and the CIA: An Approach to End the Confusion and Controversy, 68 Minn. L. Rev .
1231 (1983).
90. See, e.g., Michael D. Becker, Piercing Glomar: Using the Freedom o f Information Act
and the Official Acknowledgement Doctrine to Keep Government Secrecy in Check, 64 Admin .
L. R ev . 673 (2012); Nathan F. Wessler, “[We] Can Neither Confirm nor Deny the Existence or
Nonexistence o f Records Responsive to Your Request ”: Reforming the Glomar Response Under
FOIA, 85 N.Y.U. L. R ev. 1381 (2010); Christina E. Wells, CIA v. Sims: Mosaic Theory and
Government Attitude, 58 A dmin . L. Rev . 845 (2006); David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory,
National Security, and the Freedom o f Information Act, 115 Y ale L.J. 628 (2005); Danae J.
Atchison. Reining in the Glomar Response: Reducing CIA Abuse o f the Freedom o f Information
Act, 27 U.C. Davis L. Rev . 219 (1993).
91. See, e.g., Martin E. Halsluk, Speed Bumps on the Information Superhighway: A Study
o f Federal Agency Compliance with the Electronic Freedom o f Information Act o f 1996, 5 C omm .
L. & Pol ’y, 423 (2000); Lotte E. Feinberg. Managing the Freedom o f Information Act and
Federal Information Policy: The Reagan Years: 6 Gov. Info. Q. 345 (1989); Lotte E. Feinberg,
Managing the Freedom o f Information Act and Federal Information Policy, 46 Pub. A dmtn. Rev .
615 (1986).
92. See, e.g., M ichael Schudson, T he R ise of the R ight to Know : Politics and the
C ulture of T ransparency, 1945-1975(2015); Dave E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 Stan. L. R ev .
257 (2010); Shannon E. Martin & Gerry Lanosga, Historical and Legal Underpinnings o f Access
to Public Documents, 102 L. Libr. J. 613 (2010); Kiyul Uhm, The Founders and the Revolutionary
Underpinning o f the Concept o f the Right to Know, 85 JOURNALISM& Mass C omm . Q. 393 (2008);
A lasdair S. Roberts, Blacked O ut: G overnment S ecrecy in the Information A ge (2006);
Kiyul Uhm, The Cold War Communication Crisis: The Right to Know Movement, 82 Journalism
& Mass Comm . Q. 131 (2005); Herbert N. Forestel, Freedom of Information and the Right
to Know : T he O rigins and A pplications of the Freedom of Information A ct (1999);
Charles J. Wichmann III, Ridding FOIA o f Those Unanticipated Consequences: Repaving a
Necessary Road to Freedom, Al Duke L.J. 1213 (1997); Paul H. Gates & Bill F. Chamberlin,
Madison Misinterpreted: Historical Presentism Skews Scholarship, 13 A m . JOURNALISM 38
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These are worthy and important avenues o f FOIA research, but the
mismanaged Clinton requests document blight at the root o f the FOIA
system. Much of the existing scholarship, however, has assumed the
stability of archives and good faith in agency searches. In an effort to
understand the depths o f the rot, this study will explore records
management and search procedures in the FOIA and survey potential
paths forward for improving on the existing accountability paradigm.
In Parts II and III, this Article will review the systemic failures that
appeared in the Clinton email fiasco, archive integrity and adequacy of
search. These are lightly researched areas. With regard to archive
integrity, this is largely due to the presuppositions o f the statute, which
relies on faithful accordance with independent record-keeping laws.
There is considerable jurisprudence on adequacy o f search, as it has
vexed requesters since enactment, but there has been little in the way of
statutory movement or scholarly comment.
Part III will focus on affirmative disclosure, a topic of a great interest
to contemporary government transparency scholars. For FOIA
researchers, the endemic shortcomings o f the mechanism have led many
to call for a transformation of the FOIA to a more affirmative disclosureoriented system. Such a suggestion is practicable as the FOIA comprises
three sections but is most well-known for the requester-release element.93
The two other sections are affirmative disclosure requirements, one
dictating basic agency information and new administrative rules to be
published in the Federal Register .94 The second affirmative disclosure
part necessitates digital publication o f a range o f records not distributed
in the Federal Register, including court rulings on agency rules, policy
interpretation adopted by the agency, a general index o f agency records
on-hand and, notably, any records that have been released to a requester
in the past.9^ The last provision requires agencies to post to their website
all records previously released in response to a FOIA request.
David Pozen is amongst the scholars pushing for more proactive
transparency. He has questioned the FOIA experiment and the undying
commitment to it, cataloging its many Haws.96 He suggests FOIA only
(1996); Phillip J. Cooper. The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Freedom o f Information,
P ub . A dmin . R ev . 622 (1986); Patricia M. Wald. The Freedom o f Information Act: A Short Case
Study in the Perils and Paybacks o f Legislating Democratic Values, 33 E mory L.J. 649 (1984);
Lillian R. Devier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search fo r a Constitutional
Principle, 68 C al . L. R ev. 482 (1980); Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations o f the Right to
Know, 1976 WASH. U. L. Q. 1 (1976); Ralph Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the
Agencies, 5 H arv . C.R.-C.L. L. R f.v . 1 (1970).
93. 5 U.S.C. tj 552(a)(3)(A) (2018).
94. Id. tj 552(a)(1).
95. Id. § 552(a)(2).
96. David E. Pozen, Freedom o f Information Beyond the Freedom o f Information Act. 165
U. P a . L. R ev . 1097, 1099 (2017) (observing the law is “shot through with exemptions . . . has
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truly works for those well-versed in the intricacies o f the law and
dedicated to tirelessly battling agencies; in short, large institutions with
legal teams, not typical citizens. Pozen proposes moving past the
American infatuation with requester release and turning toward
affirmative disclosure: “To make good on the promise o f FOIA over the
next fifty years o f the Act’s life . . . we will need to devote greater
attention and resources to a range o f information-forcing mechanisms .” 97
Margaret Kwoka has produced significant research exploring the primary
users o f the FOIA .98 Her results echoed Pozen’s claims o f institutional
dominance o f FOIA use, finding the preponderance o f requests serve
business interests .99 The FOIA has become a mechanism for transferring
government wealth to private enterprise. Instead o f serving individuals
and the press, as originally intended, the FOIA has become a form of
corporate subsidy with private firms exploiting the law through
methodical FOIA programs operated by large legal teams . 100 Kwoka, too,
has pointed toward affirmative disclosure in an effort to return the FOIA
to its democratic objectives and as a method aligned with the digital
future . 101 Affirmative disclosure, as a predominately technical response
to the FOIA’s problems, is especially well suited to counteract the
formulaic, sometimes algorithmic, information-seeking efforts o f
businesses . 102 Effectively, agencies could reduce personnel and recapture
FOIA by applying simple machine learning in response to the growing
tide o f machine-generated business requests.
Daxton Stewart and Charles Davis have claimed the FOIA is
“petrified” and has been unable to address the failures o f the APA . 103
They claimed the requester release system that pits requester against
agency is the “original sin” of the FOIA and have also called for

never been funded at a level that would allow agencies to respond promptly to most requests.. . .
land that] courts affirm agency denial decisions at extraordinary rates. Attorneys’ fees and other
litigation costs remain difficult to recover. . . and sanctions for improper withholding are virtually
never applied.”).
97. Id. at 1102.
98. Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 D u k e L.J. 1361, 1361 (2016).
99. Id. at 1414 (explaining that FOIA primarily serves business interests along the lines of
“researching competitors’ business ventures about which an agency happens to have information,
uncovering regulatory risks to better advise investors, or simply using FOIA to find out what
others are learning about you . . . . ”).
100. Id at 1415.
101. Id. at 1429 (“Especially in light of technological advances, affirmative disclosure holds
the key to unlock true government transparency.”).
102. Id. at 1430 (“Although affirmative disclosure initiatives have not fulfilled their promise
thus far, commercial requesting provides an area ripe for targeted affirmative disclosure
because . . . commercial requesting, by and large, is a formulaic enterprise.”).
103. Daxton R. “Chip” Stewart & Charles N. Davis, Bringing Back Full Disclosure: A Call
fo r Dismantling FOIA, 21 COMM. L. & Pol ’y 515, 516-17 (2016).
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affirmative disclosure as the obvious path forward.104 The FOIA is seen
as a product o f a paper record-keeping era and will forever remain
constrained by the law’s initial conception o f access to physical
documents. A primary issue in delivering on FOIA objectives was the
government’s variegated approach to adopting computer systems and
digitizing information. There was little in the way o f standardized record
keeping in the 1980s.10:1 Many agencies independently developed
methods for digital archiving and search, and agencies were slow to move
on from paper records. In the 1990s, computer use in the government
grew exponentially, but access to digital records was hardly a concern in
the development o f government computer systems.106 Stewart and Davis
advocate the dismantling of the FOIA and enactment o f a new law based
on three principles: open and accessible documents from the moment of
creation; narrowly construed exemptions, used sparingly and
transparently reported; and records should be harder to conceal than
release.107 While the second and third suggestions are ostensibly active in
the current FOIA, redrafting FOIA in the digital age, for the digital age,
is of primacy in conquering the many failures o f the FOIA.108 Access to
government records necessitates a change o f culture and function,
including electronic and automated record-keeping: “Codification of
proactive transparency-first FOIA system would move beyond
incremental fixes at the agency and administrative level, which are
improvements but nevertheless would be subject to the whim of
presidential administrations and directives, to keep the emphasis on the
‘presumption of openness.’” 100 Others have called on Congress to move
past FOIA’s paper-based format and the accordant requester’s paradox in
favor o f increased affirmative disclosure.11(1
104. Id. at 518.
105. Id. at 522.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 529 (“ 1. Government records should be open and accessible by the public from
the moment of creation, using portals and automation to reduce barriers to access as much as
possible. 2. Exceptions that would result in closure or redaction should be narrow, used sparingly,
determined when a record is created, and transparently reported to the public. Consequences for
abusing exemptions or otherwise violating the law should be severe and swift. 3. Incentives should
be shifted so that it is harder to close a record than to make it available for public inspection and
copying. Government inaction should never result in delay or denial of access.”).
108. Id. at 536.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Michael llerz. Law Lags Behind: FOIA and Affirmative Disclosure o f
Information, 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol ’y & Ethics J. 577, 597 (2009) (“[Affirmative disclosure] is
undeniably a step beyond the current statute, for it does not require an actual request to trigger
dissemination. Hut it is still keyed to the question of what citizens might ask for rather than what
citizens might find useful. Because requestors generally, and by definition, do not know what the
agency has, the requestor-based system will always be incomplete.”); David C. Vladeck,
Information Access—Surveying the Current Legal Landscape o f Federal Right-to-Know Laws, 86
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Beth Simone Noveck has suggested turning away from the adversaria!
nature o f requester release, rallying behind another popular government
transparency initiative, typically referred to as either Open Data or Open
Government.
Her proposal emphasizes purpose over feel-good
rhetoric: “[0]pen data substitutes a utilitarian rationale for transparency
in place o f a justification based on moral obligation. In other words, open
data is rooted in a theory about government effectiveness whereas FOIA
is grounded in a theory o f governmental legitimacy.” 112
In Part III, this Article will more closely examine the United States’
lasting commitment to affirmative disclosure and recent experiments in
expanding the principles. Recent government inroads and a growing body
o f scholarship advocating for more affirmative disclosure attest to it being
the future of government access. Pozen suggested tinkering with the
mechanics of the FOIA to be regressive, “Given FOIA’s many limitations
and drawbacks, a forward-looking legislative approach must do more
than refine the Act’s request-driven strategy: it must look beyond the
FOIA strategy altogether.” 113 The most scalable and plausible approach
to be replacing the FOIA is a comprehensive affirmative disclosure
regime.1 4
II. A rchive Integrity

The FOIA presumes the integrity o f agency archives. Without wellmaintained archives, there is no stability in the FOIA system. Despite this
necessity, there is no corresponding link between federal records laws
and the FOIA. FOIA rests atop archive and records management laws but
makes no specific mention o f it, nor are records laws responsive to the
FOIA. This disconnect has presented issues when requests for known
records return “no responsive records” closures. Appealing records
custody and maintenance has resulted in courts considering whether the
public has an interest or right to compel custody. Judicial opinion is
mixed on the matter, but the statutory language provides agencies with a
near absolute authority in dictating which records are retained and which
records are disposed of.

Tex . L. Rev . 1787, 1836 (2008) (calling on Congress to pass a law “requiring the government to
open up other categories of information to ready public access. And it will have to grapple with
the broader question, which already looms on the horizon, o f how to replace FOIA once paper
records are a thing o f the past.”).
111. Beth. S. Noveck, Is Open Data the Death o f FOIA?, 126 Y ale. L.J. F. 273,274 (2016).
112. Id. at 284.
113. Pozen, supra note 96, at 1101.
114. Id. at 1151.
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A. Records Management Law
The federal government is required by law to handle and preserve
records in a deliberate and orderly fashion. The Constitution makes two
references to record keeping, calling on Congress to keep and publish an
account o f events"6 and vote totals.116 The framers were likely less
interested in contemporaneous accountability mechanisms, like FOIA or
the Government in the Sunshine A ct,117 but were committed to keeping
an accurate account of affairs.118
Our present understanding o f records management is primarily
defined by the 1943 Records Disposal A ct119 and the Federal Records Act
o f 1950 (FRA).120 The FRA was a product o f the Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. The resulting
report listed three general recommendations, all focused on providing a
more defined structure for the federal government’s records management
practices.121 As it stands today, the U.S. Code contains seven sections
dedicated solely to records management for federal agencies.122 This slim
chapter o f U.S. law exists as the backbone o f the FOIA, providing the
statutory requirements for the handling o f agency records; how such
information is classified, transferred, archived or destroyed. The law
assigns responsibility to the heads of all federal agencies for establishing
responsible records management procedures, including “adequate and
proper documentation of the organization, functions, policies, decisions,
procedures, and essential transactions of the agency.” 123 Agency heads
are given wide-ranging authority in determining the internal policies for
records management but are responsible for creating, maintaining and

115. U.S. Const, art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (“Each I louse shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and
from lime to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require
Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the
Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.”).
116. Id. § 7 (“If [the President! approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his
Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large
on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider i t . . . . But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses
shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the
Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively.”).
117. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2018).
118. A nne W. Branscomb, Who O wns Information? From Privacy to P ublic Access
165 (1994) (“The collection of information was a primary concern of the founding fathers and
one for which they were prepared to pay a modest amount o f money.”).
119. Records Disposal Act of 1943, ch. 192, 57 Stat. 380.
120. Federal Records Act of 1950, ch. 849, 64 Stat. 578.
121. C omm, on O rg. of the E xec. Branch of the Gov ’t, 81st C ong ., R ecords
Management in the U nited States Government: A Report with R ecommendations 6
(Comm. Print 1949).
122. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3107 (2016).
123. Id. §3101.
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documenting the current business o f the agency.124 There is little firm
supervision over agency records practices, but agencies are to work with
the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in
coordinating historical custody and solutions when records go missing.125
Notably, the law makes explicit reference to the safeguarding o f agency
records, prohibiting alienation or destruction o f records and includes
penalties and procedures for lapses in records management.
Seven years prior to the FRA, Congress passed the Records Disposal
A ct.126 The federal government had long been concerned with records
maintenance and orderly destruction o f unnecessary records. Physical
storage required significant and growing resources, and the threat o f fire
was ever present. Before providing agencies with authority for record
maintenance, the legislature detailed how and when records were to be
disposed.127 The law outlined specific procedures for reporting proposed
schedules o f unneeded records, followed by a waiting period and
ultimately a determination on disposal from the head o f NARA.128 The
agency is only able to destroy or remove from custody records that lack
preservation value and “do not appear to have sufficient administrative,
legal, research, or other value.” 1 9 The law provides a clear expectation
for chain o f custody and guards against arbitrary destruction o f records.
Congress has continued to refine records management and disposal
law,130 but the foundation for our current records management
expectations were laid out in the 1940s and 1950s. The 2014 amendments
to the Presidential Records Act and FRA were a response to a 2011
memorandum from President Obama that brought attention to failures in
records management and called for improved performance. The
president’s hope for better records management was not only efficiencies
and cost savings but “increasing open Government and appropriate public
access to Government records.” 131 President Obama highlighted the
importance o f archive integrity, suggesting “proper records management
is the backbone o f open Government.” 132

124. Id. § 3102.
125. Id. §3102(3).
126. 44 U.S.C. ij 3106 (2016).
127. W. g§ 3301-3314.
128. Id. § 3303.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Federal Records Management Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-575, 90
Stat. 2727; Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812; Paperwork
Reduction Act Amendment of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163; Presidential and Federal
Records Act Amendments of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-187, 128 Stat. 2003.
131. Memorandum of November 28, 2011—Managing Government Records, 76 Fed. Reg.
75.423, 75,424 (Dec. 1,2011).
132. Id. at 75,423.
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At present, agency requirements ensuring archive integrity are vague
and NARA’s oversight is minimal. Records management laws and rules
are inconsistently enforced. Agency practices vary considerably, and few
are being held to account for failures . 133 Any value the FOIA has relies
on archive integrity. The gaps in the record-keeping law and inconsistent
supervision suggest the FOIA is likely far less effective than the generally
pessimistic position o f journalists and scholars. Whether public officials
are willfully disposing o f embarrassing or incriminating records or
agencies prove understaffed or incompetent in ensuring archive integrity,
the errors undermine the FOIA. Due to the requester’s paradox, such
activities are hard to know and are rarely acknowledged publicly.
B. Archive Integrity & the FOIA
Two cases stand out as illustrative in documenting the court’s position
on the confluence o f information repositories and access to government
information. In Kissinger v. Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court
found Nixon’s former Secretary o f State to have flagrantly violated
records management laws, only to determine there was no enforcement
133. See, e.g., Russ Kick, FBI Wants to Destroy 9,000+ RICO Files, A ltGov 2 (June 2,
2018), hUps://allgov2.org/fbi-deslroying-rico-files/ (noting that the FBI is in the process of
destroying more than seventy percent of their RICO records and has no intention of scanning the
documents); Patrice McDermott, Government Reorganization Still in the Dark to Both Congress
and the Public, Gov ’t Info. Watch (May 31, 2018), https://govinfowatch.net/20l8/05/
31/govemment-reorganization-still-in-the-dark-to-both-congress-and-the-public/ (documenting
the OMB’s failure to maintain or release requisite records regarding major reorganization efforts
at the Department of the Interior); Eric Katz, White House Produces No Evidence It Considered
Public Input on Reorganizing Government, GOV’T Exec. (May 2, 2018). https://rn.govexec.com/
managcment/2018/05/after-lawsuit-whitc-house-produces-no-evidence-it-considered-publicinput-reorganizing-govemment/147927/ (stating that the OMB claims to have no records on
public comment after previously stating there were more than 100,000 submissions); Joe
Davidson, ATF's Problem o f ‘Lost, Stolen, Or Missing’ Guns Has Gotten Better, But It's Still a
Problem, Wash. Post (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/
2018/04/09/afts-problem-of-lost-stolen-or-missing-guns-has-gotten-better-but-its-still-a-worry/
?noredirect=on&ulm term=.0e6a5c9f63e() (discussing a Justice Department report that
documented not only the ATF’s failure to track stolen guns in the agency’s custody but also
“significant dcliciencies related to tracking and inventory of ammunition” and general records
maintenance); Judicial Watch Sues IRS fo r Records on Destroyed Hard Drives o f Lois Lerner,
Other IRS Officials, J ud. Watch (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/pressreleases/judieial-watch-sucs-irs-records-destroycd-hard-drives-lois-lemer-irs-officials/ (asserting
that the IRS coordinated the intentional destruction of hard drives containing incriminating
information);Timothy Cama, ERA Tells Court It May Have Lost Text Messages, T he H ill, (Oct.
8, 2014. 2:42 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/220162-epa-may-have-losttext-messages (reporting that the EPA submitted a District Court fling admitting to “the potential
loss” of contested records at the center of a court case); Lost to History: Missing War Records
Complicate Benefit Claims by Iraq, Afghanistan Veterans, ProP ublica (Nov. 9, 2012, 3:45 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/lost-to-history-missing-war-records-complicate-benefitclaims-by-veterans (cataloging systemic failures by the Army in destroying or misplacing records
on field reports, security concerns and leadership issues).
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mechanism or punishment suited to the crime.134 With a series o f cases
culminating in Armstrong v. Executive Office o f the President, 135 three
consecutive presidents unsuccessfully attempted to remove Iran-contra
emails from archives subject to FOIA.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Kissinger, in particular, explicated
the relationship between the FOIA and records management, highlighting
the role o f the FRA and the responsibility o f executive agencies in
maintaining archive integrity. In the 1970s, Henry Kissinger served a
variety o f roles in the Nixon and Ford administrations. As National
Security Adviser and Secretary o f State, Kissinger developed a habit o f
having his phone calls monitored by an assistant and transcribed for
posterity.136 Five days prior to Jimmy Carter defeating Gerald Ford in the
1976 presidential election, Kissinger had his telephone transcriptions
removed from his office in the State Department. After recognizing the
breach o f federal records laws, their return was ordered by NARA. Most
o f the documents would ultimately be relocated to the Library o f
Congress before the U.S. Archivist requested the return o f the phone
transcripts to the State Department on not one but two occasions.
Kissinger refused, and the records remained with the Library o f Congress,
an entity not subject to the FOIA.
The Supreme Court case centered on three separate FOIA requests
seeking records from Kissinger’s phone transcriptions.137 All three
requests were denied by the State Department with two o f them rejected
under the same premises: a) the telephone transcripts were not agency
records (they were personal), and b) the telephone transcripts were no
longer in the custody o f the federal government.138 However, a federal
court ruled the phone records transcribed while he was Secretary o f State
(though not when he was the National Security Adviser or Special
Assistant to the President) were indeed “agency records” subject to FOIA
query. The court determined Kissinger had wrongfully removed the

134. 445 U.S. 136, 150-51 (1980).
135. 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C.Cir. 1993).
136. 445 U.S. at 140.
137. Id. at 143^14. the first request was from New York Times columnist William Satire and
sought Department o f State records for Kissinger’s telephone records that mentioned Satire by
name or “leaks.” Id. at 143. The request was denied because Kissinger was serving as National
Security Adviser, not in the State Department, during the specified period. Id. The second request
was from the Military Audit Project seeking the telephone transcripts, but the Department of State
determined a) they were not agency records, and b) they no longer held the records as they had
been removed from the department’s custody. Id. The third request, brought by journalism
organizations, was very similar to the Military Audit Project’s request and was denied under the
same explanations. Id. at 143-44.
138. Id.
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records and ordered the transcripts (still in the custody of the Library of
Congress) searched for responsive records. 139
The plaintiffs had successfully contended that whether Federal
Records and Records Disposal Acts provided a private right of action in
recovering the telephone transcripts was irrelevant; the FOIA established
such a remedy. The Supreme Court disagreed, deciding that the FOIA
statute offered no such ability, with Justice William Rehnquist declaring
federal courts were limited to enjoining agencies only when agency
records were improperly withheld and not otherwise. 140 Since Kissinger
had removed the records from State Department possession—wrongfully
or not—it was impossible for the records to be improperly “withheld.” 1 1
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion flatly stated, “The [FOIA] does not obligate
agencies to create or retain documents; it only obligates them to provide
access to those which it in fact has created and retained. " 142
In an opinion containing both partial concurrence and partial dissent,
Justice William Brennan called the Court’s stance on improper
withholding a “crabbed interpretation.” 143 Justice Brennan observed,
“[T]he Records Acts and FOIA fail to mesh: The former scheme is
evidently directed toward fostering administrative interests, while the
latter is definitely designed to serve the needs of the general public.” 144
While the majority opinion failed to address the intentional
circumvention of the FOIA, Justice Brennan addressed it:
If FOIA is to be more than a dead letter, it must
necessarily incorporate some restraint upon the agency’s
powers to move documents beyond the reach of the FOIA
requester. . . . I would think it is also plainly unacceptable
for an agency to devise a records routing system aimed at
frustrating FOIA requests in general by moving documents
outside agency custody with unseemly haste. . . . If the
purpose of FOIA is to provide public access to the records
incorporated into Government decisionmaking, then
agencies may well have a concomitant responsibility to
retain possession of, or control over, those records. 4~
Justice John Paul Stevens also wrote an opinion that was partconcurrence, part-dissent, challenging the acceptance of wrongfully

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 145.
at 150.
at 152.
at 158.
at 159.
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
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removed records and suggesting the opinion incentivized the illegal
removal o f records.146
Well after the Supreme Court’s decision, Kissinger’s phone
transcripts were still in dispute. In 2001, the National Security Archive, a
non-profit focused on foreign policy and open government, sent a
complaint to the State Department and the National Archives suggesting
that Kissinger’s phone transcripts were improperly removed, subject to
the FOIA and in violation o f federal records law.147 After the Bush
administration convinced Kissinger to return the records to the State
Department and National Archives, the National Security Archive
submitted a FOIA request for the newly returned phone transcripts. Three
years later, the State Department delivered more than 3,500 responsive
documents but withheld a substantial number o f records as well. Over the
next eleven years, the National Security Archive would appeal denials
and redactions. Curiously, more than thirty years after their creation,
some o f the records were withheld under Exemption 5 as “predecisional.” 148 The National Security Archive would ultimately win the
release o f more than 1,000 additional documents.149
The National Security Archive played a role in another case of missing
agency records. Tom Blanton, head o f the organization, pursued
incriminating emails from the Iran-contra scandal, while a succession o f
U.S. presidents claimed the right to destroy the records. The National
Security Archive would submit a FOIA request and ultimately win the
release o f the emails, despite, in Blanton’s narrative, the Reagan White
House’s coordinated efforts to avoid embarrassment and hide potentially
criminal behavior.150
By the m id-1980s, email was pervasive within the federal government
and a trail o f emails existed documenting the unscrupulous chain o f Irancontra events. Oliver North and another national security adviser
attempted to undo the trail by erasing thousands o f emails, but a career
public servant and ranking military colonel forwent the traditional bi
weekly deletion o f backup tapes and instead put this particular two-week
146. Id. at 161 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I cannot agree that
this conclusion is compelled by the plain language of the statute; moreover, it seems to me wholly
inconsistent with the congressional purpose underlying the Freedom of Information Act. The
decision today exempts documents that have been wrongfully removed from the agency’s fdes
from any scrutiny whatsoever under FOIA. It thus creates an incentive for outgoing agency
officials to remove potentially embarrassing documents from their files in order to frustrate future
FOIA requests.”).
147. Archive Sues Slate Department Over Kissinger Telcons, N at’l Sec. A rchive (Mar. 4,
2015), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB503/.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Tom Blanton, White House E-M ail: The T op Secret Computer M essages the
R eagan/B ush W hite House T ried to D estroy 7 (1995).
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segment o f White House communications aside, preserving the record
despite North and company’s intentions . 1'11
North’s correspondence would play an important role in the report by
the Tower Commission (the federal investigation of Iran-contra), but as
President George H.W. Bush prepared to begin his presidential term, the
emails had not been released to the public. Like Kissinger, the
presidential transition was to coincide with a new record-keeping era, and
the backup tapes o f the emails were scheduled to be destroyed (with the
approval o f NARA). The National Security Archive sought a last-minute
injunction against the destruction and filed a FOIA request to establish
legal grounds for the maneuver.
The effort to save the emails (and have them released under a FOIA
request) culminated in Armstrong v. Bush,
where the D.C. District
Court considered the same central question from Kissinger—whether
citizens can compel government to retain records— under different
circumstances . 153 Whereas in Kissinger the court decided the FOIA
offered no remedy when agencies desire to remove or destroy records
from an archive , 114 in Armstrong, the court sought to determine whether
the Presidential Records Act, 155 or other records management statutes,
could force agencies to preserve records . 116 Judge Charles Richey found
in favor o f the plaintiff, deciding the APA “empowers a private plaintiff
to seek judicial review o f presidential performance under [the
Presidential Records and Federal Records acts ] . ” 157
The court found the APA obligation to retain records to be
nondiscretionary. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit also found in favor of
Armstrong and the National Security Archive . 118 Though the FRA was
determined to provide private citizens an ability to force agencies to abide
by their own recordkeeping guidelines, the APA allows individuals the
right to sue the U.S. Archivist or an agency head for a failing “to take
enforcement action to prevent an agency official from destroying records
in contravention o f the agency’s recordkeeping guidelines or to recover
records unlawfully removed from an agency.” 59 A pivotal outcome,
public officials do hold a duty or responsibility for maintaining archive
integrity and are explicitly required to protect against unlawful
destruction or removal.
151.
152.
1991).
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 4-5.
721 F. Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 1989), aff'd in pari, rev’d in part, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir.
Id. at 344.
Kissinger v. Reporters Comm, for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 139 (1980).
44 U.S.C. t)ij 2201-2207 (2016).
Armstrong, 721 F. Supp. at 344.
Id. at 348.
Armstrongv. Bush. 924 F.2d 282, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Id.
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Despite the Appeals Court decision, President George H.W. Bush’s
staff rounded up the existing tapes containing the emails and, on the eve
o f President Bill Clinton’s inauguration, the White House ordered NARA
to collect and remove all tapes from the grounds.160 According to
Blanton, in the waning hours o f his presidency, Bush had come to an
agreement with the U.S. Archivist that would have ceded custody o f all
tapes o f presidential emails to Bush.161 However, the tapes were not
destroyed, and President Clinton’s administration continued to defend
Reagan and Bush’s right to destroy the White House emails in the courts,
while also battling for the agreement between Bush and the archivist in
another case.162
In Armstrong v. Executive Office o f the President,163 the Circuit Court
reversed the D.C. District Court’s finding o f civil contempt for the U.S.
Archivist and several federal agencies for allowing the last-minute
transfer o f the tapes, while also affirming the existing records
management guidelines were in violation of the FRA.164 After a firm
rebuke for the handling o f the tapes by the district court, the D.C. Circuit
remanded the crux o f the case— whether records would be released— and
called on the agencies to align their records management guidelines with
the FRA.165
In the end, Armstrong, Blanton and the National Security Archives
would win the release o f the emails, but the case would produce no
standing for requiring agencies to hold or retrieve records.166 Federal
courts have decided there is a duty to maintain records when they may
contain incriminating evidence or lead to litigation. This applies to both
private companies167 and the federal government.168 In this scenario,
government is expected to voluntarily “suspend its routine document
retention/destruction policy.” 169
Armstrong v. Bush was cited frequently in a 2016 case involving
Hillary Clinton’s email scandal,170 but the D.C. District Court effectively

160. Blanton, supra note 150, at 9-10.
161. Id. at 10 (explaining that the same archivist, Don W. Wilson, granted President Reagan
the ability to destroy the original tapes | which was halted and ultimately overridden by the courts]
and would resign shortly after Bush left office to take over leadership o f the George Bush
Presidential Library).
162. Id. at 10-11.
163. 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
164. Id. at 1296.
165. Id. at 1296-97.
166. Id.
167. See Silveslri v. Gen. Motors Corp, 271 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2001); Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
168. See Kronisch v. United Stales, 150 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1998).
169. 220 F.R.D. at 218.
170. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Kerry, 156 F. Supp. 3d 69 (D.D.C. 2016).
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reversed the decision , 171 recognizing an individual’s right to compel
action “is limited to those circumstances in which an agency head and
Archivist have taken minimal or no action to remedy the removal or
172
destruction of federal records.”
At present, there is no conclusive right, ability or expectation for a
private citizen to any records retention or archive integrity. Agencies
abide by their internal records management practices in accordance with
the general guidance o f the FRA and other light-touch laws. Agencies are
expected to coordinate disposal with the NARA, but everyday
maintenance of archives is well beyond the scope o f any NARA
responsibility, as demonstrated in the State Department failures with
Secretary Clinton.
III.

A

dequacy of

Search

Search procedures have been an obstinate FOIA concern. The
information asymmetry at the heart o f the requester release system is
particularly acute in the search process. The original agency aversion to
releasing records and the increasingly adversarial nature o f the law have
only amplified the issue. Defining an adequate search has proved
especially elusive, as agencies often retain huge physical repositories of
records and determining appropriate search parameters can be more of an
art than a science. The two parties have decidedly different perspectives
and different conceptions o f a successful search. A requester is endsoriented. A successful search means finding and producing the sought
information. Agencies are more process-oriented. They are focused on
following logical guidelines in an effort to locate the information, not
singularly focused on finding a needle in a haystack. The task has proved
to be a moving target as well. The FOIA was enacted in a paper-centric
era, and the shift to digital records has necessitated a new paradigm for
search.
A. Statutory Definition
With regards to the agency search procedure, the FOIA statute has
relatively little to say, defining search as “to review, manually or by
automated means, agency records for the purpose of locating those
records which are responsive to a request.” 173 The court has further
refined adequate search with the current precedent outlining expectations

171. Id. at 75-76 (“Straightforward as this may appear, the Court does not agree. . . . The
mere fact that federal records were removed from the State Department in contravention of the
FRA, therefore, does not automatically entitle a private litigant to a court order requiring the
agency to involve the Attorney General in legal action to recover the documents.”).
172. Id. at 76.
173. 5 U.S.C. (j 552(a)(3)(D) (2018).
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as “reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” 174
Determining a reasonable search is not predicated on the results, but, as
the D.C. Circuit outlined, “ [T]he adequacy o f a FOIA search is generally
determined not by the fruits o f the search, but by the appropriateness of
the methods used to carry out the search.” 175
The statutory provisions defining search and search expectations were
not adopted until the 1996 Electronic Freedom o f Information A ct.176 The
House report for the law, under a section titled “The Effect o f Electronic
Records,” suggested the digitization o f records necessitated formalized
search protocols.177 The report also discussed the motives behind
“reasonable” as the standard for satisfactory search, noting a less diligent
search would also use up agency computers, before concluding that
electronic searches and paper-based searches should be roughly equal
with regards to expenditure o f agency resources.178 In floor discussion o f
the bill, Rep. Randy Tate marveled at the potential range and ease of
access to government records.177 Rep. Tate’s enthusiasm was shared by
many in Congress as they intended to move a large amount o f the
government’s paper records online and the democratic possibilities o f this
transfer were seen as tremendous.
The Senate produced a report for a similar FOIA bill180 that would
ultimately be consolidated with the House’s bill. They also considered
what constituted a “reasonable effort,” concluding that no matter the new
robust possibilities agencies should guard against disruption o f the
agency’s core functions.181 The Senate considered guidelines for the
appropriate amount o f time to satisfy an adequate search but produced
nothing beyond the general search parameters in the statute.

174. Weisbergv. U .S.D ep’t of Justice, 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
175. Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311. 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
176. Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231,
110 Stat. 3048. 3050.
177. H.R. Rep. N o . 104-795, at 11 (1996).
178. Id. at 22.
179. 142 C ong . R ec. 1110,450 (daily cd. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement of Rep. Tate) (“My
neighbors will be able to turn on their computers— click onto the internet— and download
information made accessible by the [bill]. . . . The use of the latest technology by Government
agencies will harness the benefits of computer technology and deliver to everyone increased
Government accessibility.”).
180. S. 1090, 104th Cong. (1996).
181. S. R ep. N o . 104-272, at 15 (1996) (“What constitutes a ‘reasonable effort’ shall vary
with the circumstances under which the records are held. We recognize that both agency computer
program development resources and agency computer system operation resources are highly
valuable and Unite. Both of these categories of agency resources shall be impinged upon by the
level o f new search activity required under the amendments. Agencies should search for and
retrieve data according to new specifications where such retrieval activity does not disrupt agency
functions.”).
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Outside the 1996 FOIA amendment and its legislative discussion,
there is little in way o f defining agency responsibility regarding
“reasonable search.” The Senate report from the 1974 FOIA amendment
foresaw the digital evolution, suggesting digital search and databases
“would include services functionally analogous to searches for records
that are maintained in conventional forms.” 182 But the affordances o f
digital records have not produced significantly different request
outcomes, as rates o f denials and appeals remain relatively consistent
over time.
B. Judicial Interpretation
Federal courts, on the other hand, have been frequently tasked with
defining “reasonable search” and determining “adequacy o f search.”
Challenging the adequacy o f search is the product o f the requester’s
paradox. When a request returns a “no records” response, a natural
response is to appeal. The FOIA Project, an offshoot o f Syracuse
University’s Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, has annotated
4,373 federal FOIA cases from 1996 to present and sorted them by
issue.183 They identified more than 171 issues in the FOIA cases, ranging
from segregation to individual exemptions. “Adequacy o f search” was
the third most common issue in complaints (behind “failure to respond
within statutory time limit” and “litigation - attorney’s fees”) and the
most common issue by a large margin in court opinions. “Adequacy of
search” was identified as an issue in 624 complaints and 550 federal
opinions.
One of the most influential and commonly cited FOIA cases, Vaughn
v. Rosen,184 was the result o f the D.C. Circuit ruminating on FOIA search
processes and the adversarial nature of the requester release system. The
case centered on a law professor who had filed a FOIA request with the
Civil Service Commission for personnel evaluation reports. The
responsive records were withheld under Exemptions 2, 5 and 6. Vaughn
appealed, contesting both the exemption claims and the legitimacy o f the
search.
Writing for the D.C. Circuit, Judge Malcolm Wilkey underscored the
court’s preference for transparency, claiming an “overwhelming
emphasis upon disclosure.” 185 Judge Wilkey identified the unbalanced
nature o f a FOIA dispute:

182. S. Rep. No . 93-854, at 12 (1974).
183. The FOIA Project, Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Syracuse University
(Mar. 23, 2018), http://foiaprojcct.org/casc search/.
184. 484 F.2d 820, 823-24 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
185. Id. at 823.
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In a very real sense, only one side to the controversy (the
side opposing disclosure) is in a position confidently to make
statements categorizing information . . . . The best [an]
appellant can do is to argue that the exception is very narrow
and plead that the general nature o f the documents sought
make it unlikely that they contain such personal
information---- This lack of knowledge by the party seeking
disclosure seriously distorts the traditional adversary nature
o f our legal system's form of dispute resolution. Ordinarily,
the facts relevant to a dispute are more or less equally
available to adverse parties. In a case arising under the FOIA
this is not true, as we have noted, and hence the typical
process of dispute resolution is impossible.186
Judge Wilkey proceeded to establish the practice o f the Vaughn index,
whereby courts perform an in camera audit o f a sample o f the exempted
records.187 A Vaughn index requires the agency to produce an affidavit
detailing each exempted passage along with the accordant exemption
claim.18
In a case involving a Vaughn index, the Church o f Scientology sought
NSA records on the church, the religion broadly and Scientology founder
L. Ron Hubbard.189 The NSA responded claiming it had no files on either
the church or Hubbard.190 In the course o f concurrent FOIA requests with
the CIA and Department o f State, the church learned o f at least 16
documents concerning Scientology held by the N SA .191 The NSA then
found the records and withheld them under Exemption 1 and 3 claims.192
The church sued and sought further information on the NSA’s search
procedure.191 The D.C. Circuit agreed to hear the case partially in an
effort to further ^robe the search procedures and the adequacy o f the
agency’s search. 4 The church argued that claims o f a thorough search
were demonstrably false, presenting evidence o f prolonged
correspondence between the two parties. In each, the church had offered
additional information to aid the search and was each time told all
locations that could be reasonably expected to contain the records had

186. Id. at 823-25.
187. Id. at 826-27.
188. Id.
189. Founding Church of Scientology v. NSA, 610 F.2d 824, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 825-26.
193. Id. at 826.
194. Id. at 831 (“In our view, the Boardman affidavit was far too conclusory to support the
summary judgment awarded NSA— Not only does the Boardman statement fail to indicate even
in the slightest how agency functions might be unveiled, but it also lacks so much as guarded
specificity as to the ‘certain functions and activities’ that might be revealed.”).
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been searched.19^ Then, the sixteen records were found. Through other
FOIA requests, the church learned the NSA had meddled in other
searches and “that sixteen documents encompassed by appellant’s
request had been provided to CIA by NSA and that NSA had advised
against their release .” 196 Judge Spottswood W. Robinson questioned an
intelligence service that was unable to adequately search its own
archives . 197 The opinion proceeded to underscore the deleterious nature
o f such duplicitous behavior . 198 Judge Robinson observed that tolerance
o f such unmotivated search risked undermining the entirety of the FOIA
project and was tantamount to conceding secrecy to the agencies . 199
Federal courts have continued to weigh in on adequacy o f search, but
the inherent imbalance o f the requester release system means a
satisfactory search procedure is unlikely for requesters. In more than forty
years o f jurisprudence, courts have demonstrated ambivalence in
determining whether the ultimate goal was the product or a good faith
effort .200 Recent cases, including Mobley, seem to trend toward accepting

195. Id. at 834.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 835 (“On a broader scale, since NSA’s prime mission is to acquire and disseminate
information to the intelligence community, it seems odd that it is without some mechanism
enabling location of materials o f the type appellant asked for, particularly with identifying details
as extensive as those furnished.”).
198. Id. at 836-37 (“To accept its claim of inability to retrieve the requested documents in
the circumstances presented is to raise the specter of easy circumvention of the Freedom of
Information Act. Few if any requesters will be better informed than appellant on the particulars
of data that may have been obtained clandestinely by a governmental intelligence agency.”).
199. Id. at 837 (“If the agency can lightly avoid its responsibilities by laxity in identification
or retrieval of desired materials, the majestic goals of the Act will soon pass beyond reach. And
if, in the face of well-defined requests and positive indications of overlooked materials, an agency
can so easily avoid adversary scrutiny of its search techniques, the Act will inevitably become
nugatory.”).
200. See, e.g., Mobley v. CIA, 806 F.3d 568, 581-82 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (stating that short of
proof that a sworn statement was disingenuous, the court will presume good faith in the agency’s
account of search procedure. Despite the FBI failing to search the Baltimore Field Office after a
Baltimore newspaper cited an FBI source stating the Baltimore office was working on the Mobley
case, the court found the agency’s search satisfactory. “Further, a request for an agency to search
a particular record system—without more— does not invariably constitute a Mead’ that an agency
must pursue.”); Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t o f Army, 920 F.2d 57, 67-68 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting that
the State Department “only searched the record system 'most likely’ to contain the requested
information . . . . There is no requirement that an agency search every record system.”); Meeropol
v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 952-53 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“|A | search is not unreasonable simply because
it fails to produce all relevant material.”); Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (“Agency affidavits enjoy a presumption of good faith, which will withstand
purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents.”); Goland
v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 755, 760 (D.D.C. 1974)
(considering the adversarial nature of FOIA search, before determining, “[F,xxon's| discovery is
aimed not at ascertaining whether identified records have been produced, but whether there exist
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agency account o f faithful search procedures.201
Two relatively recent cases demonstrate the constant tension between
agencies and requesters. In a consolidated case, National Security
Counselors v. CIA,202 the appellant challenged the adequacy o f the search
after a “no records” response.203 While awaiting the hearing, another
State Department agency (one other than the agency that provided the “no
records” response) replied with the requested material.204 The initial
agency had collectively forgotten it had referred the request.205 Rather
than gracefully acknowledging the error, the initial agency suggested it
had performed an adequate search, declaring that were it to do it over
again, it would not have referred the request.206 The District Court then
ordered the agency to search all offices for the sought records (which
turned up more responsive information).207
Another recent case has suggested that federal departments and
agencies may intentionally utilize antiquated search techniques in an
effort to staunch record requests. The appellant therein, prolific requester
Ryan Shapiro, filed an appeal claiming the FBI has systematically and
strategically processed FOIA requests using a knowingly outdated 21year-old software program to return “no records” responses to
requesters.208 The Department o f Justice has confirmed the FBI’s practice
o f using only one o f the three search functions - the most general - as
fulfilling FOIA requirements.209 Shapiro called the use o f the narrowest
search function o f the aged program “failure by design.”210 A former FBI
chief technology officer stated the Automated Case Support (“ACS”)
system was “based on old technology” and lacks contemporary
programming and search functionality.211 The FBI continues to use ACS
despite the 2012 roll-out o f the $425 million digital management system

additional records that might be specifically identified by Exxon. It would be unreasonable to read
the intent o f Congress expressed in the Freedom of Information [Act] to require such discovery.”).
201. Mobley, 806 F.3d at 381.
202. 960 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D.D.C. 2013).
203. Id. at 119.
204. Id. at 122.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 154.
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., Shapiro v. L.S. Dep’t of Justice, 153 F. Supp. 3d. 253 (D.D.C. 2016); Will
Potter, Meet the Punk Rocker Who Can Liberate Your FBI File, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 13, 2013,
11:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.eom/politics/2013/l 1/foia-ryan-shapiro-fbi-files-lawsuit.
209. Sam Thiclman, Justice Department “Uses Aged Computer System to Frustrate FOIA
Requests,” T h e G u a r d ia n (July 16, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/
2016/jul/16/justice-department-freedom-of-information-computer-system.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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Sentinel.212 The Justice Department has said search o f both Sentinel and
ACS “would be needlessly duplicative.”213
Adequacy o f search presents the proverbial Gordian knot whereby the
parties’ divergent interests seem unlikely to be resolved under the present
FOIA system. Inherently adversarial, requesters seek nothing short of
their requested records, while agencies are protective o f time and
resources. The animosity and unsatisfactory ends are intrinsic to the
requester-release mechanism. Slicing through the tangle o f interests calls
for a new approach, one not steeped in decades o f hostility and further
complicated by ambivalent and contradictory interpretations.
IV.

A

f f ir m a t iv e

D

is c l o s u r e

The longstanding, systemic weaknesses o f critical FOIA components
call for new directions in ensuring the public’s right to know. In failing
to secure the integrity of agency archives and an inability to generate civic
or judicial faith in adequate search procedures, the requester-release
mechanism serves as a useful but flawed tool in executive transparency.
It falls well short o f the legislative commitment. Fortunately, there are
myriad complementary disclosure efforts already in place that could be
intentionally grown to help realize more effective transparency.
While the FOIA was not passed until 1966, there has been an enduring
interest in federal transparency, and it was primarily achieved through
records maintenance laws. The Constitution contains a provision
requiring publication o f congressional proceedings.214 Beyond the
constitutional proviso, the framers espoused support for a public right to
know, though their motivations and intent are not entirely clear.21:1 The
Housekeeping Act o f 1789 outlined delegation of authority, specifically
providing each department head autonomy in determining “the custody,
use, and preservation o f [the] records, papers, and property [appertaining
to the department].”216 While deficient for modern purposes, the law was
novel in acknowledging responsibility, access and distribution o f agency
2 12. See John Foley, F B I’s Sentinel Project: 5 Lessons Learned, I n i -O. WBEK (Aug. 2, 2012,
5:58 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/applications/fbis-senlinel-project-5-lessons-leamed
/d/d-id/l 105637; Thielman, supra note 209.
213. Thielman, supra note 209.
214. U.S. Const, art. 1, § 5, cl. 3 (“Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and
from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require
Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays o f the Members of either House on any question shall, at the
Desire of one fifth o f those Present, be entered on the Journal.”).
215. See, e.g., Daniel N. Hoffman, G overnmental S ecrecy and the Founding Fathers:
A Study in Constitutional Controls (1981); David M. O’Brien, T he Public’s Right to
K now: T he S upreme Cour t and the F irst A mendment (1981); Martin E. 1lalstuk. Policy o f
Secrecy—Pattern o f Deception: What Federalist Leaders Thought About a Public Right to Know,
7 C omm . L. and Pol’y 51 (2002).
216. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2018).
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records. Final dominion resided with the agency, resulting in one scholar
observing that though its laudable objective was to increase
accountability, “Nevertheless, secrecy and claims of privilege have been
the result[.]” 17
Prior to Harold Cross and John Moss sewing up the Housekeeping
Act, passage of the APA and the FOIA’s arrival was the Federal Register
Act o f 1935.218 It was established as a method for publicizing government
records, requiring all documents having “general applicability and legal
effect” to be submitted to the Office o f the Federal Register.219 These
materials were then to be published in the newly created Federal Register,
an official daily journal o f government activity. To this day, it exists as
the primary source o f government activity, publishing proposed and final
agency rules and regulations, notices o f meetings and adjudicatory
proceedings, and certain presidential documents, including executive
orders, proclamations and administrative orders.220
Shannon Martin has identified the age-old practice o f governmentissued public notices as an under-recognized mechanism for government
transparency and, in particular, affirmative disclosure.221 Martin defined
public notice as the tradition o f posting and circulating notices in
community newspapers as a method for getting information about
government work out to the electorate.222 She claimed the tradition o f
posting and circulating notices in community newspapers to be central to
representative democracies around the world.223 In the earliest iterations,
it was a method o f control, not transparency, but has evolved over time.
Governments have been affirmatively disseminating a wide range of
missives as far back as British monarchies,224 and until advent o f the
Internet, public notice was a common statutory requirement obligating
local governments to publish specific categories o f information— from
announcement o f a new law or civic procedure to advertisement o f an
impending auction or foreclosure to security warnings— in a local
newspaper. With the arrival o f broadcast, notice sometimes took the form
o f audio or video, but the objective remained. The atomization o f media
has diluted the purpose o f public notice. With no central or universally
shared medium, many governments have taken to posting public notices
to a specified area o f a government website. While the future form of
public notice remains unclear, Martin remains confident o f its purpose,
217.
218.
219.
220.
2 2 1.

Mitchell, supra note 41, at 200.
Federal Register Act, ch. 417, 49 Stat. 500 (1935).
44 U.S.C. § 1505(a) (2012).

Id.

Shannon R. Martin, Social M edia and Participatory Democracy: Public N otice
and the World Wide Web 17(2014).
222. Id.
223. Id
224. Maurice R ickards, T he Public N otice 54 (1973).
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“The value o f public notice as a means o f effective self-govemance
cannot be overstated. . . . [T]he very earliest o f representative
democracies employed public notice to chronicle government work with
an eye toward encouraging community participation in government
decision making.”226 It exists as an early, distinctive brand of affirmative
disclosure, once again demonstrating how deeply engrained and
elemental affirmative disclosure practices are to contemporary societies.
While representing different eras, the impetus o f these laws was
similar. They represent concerted government efforts at disseminating
records. The democratic pursuit o f these programs was developing an
informed public: one able and willing to participate in discourse and
responsibly wield their franchise. The founders famously spoke to these
goals,226 and the commitment to building a knowledgeable demos is
legible in the inchoate access laws. Yet, two examples best demonstrate
the depth o f the legislature’s foresight and commitment to these
principles. The Federal Depository Library Program and its digital
evolution mark an unmistakable, if unsung, fidelity to providing easily
accessible infonnation on government activity. The 1996 amendments to
the FOIA stand as a remarkable, if largely unrealized, vision in
progressing access to government information.
A. Federal Depository Library
In 1813, a congressional joint resolution established the precursor to
the Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP), requiring select
government documents be made available in designated libraries
throughout the Unites States.227 With this, Congress tasked the Secretary
o f State with dissemination of congressional documents, including Senate
and House journals, to specified state libraries, universities and historical
societies.228 Another congressional joint resolution would establish the
225. Martin, supra note 221, at 117.
226. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in 9 The
W ritings of J ames Madison: 1819-1836, 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed„ 1910) (“A popular
Government without popular infonnation, or the means of acquiring it, is hut a Prologue to a
Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people
who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge
gives.”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to F.dward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), reprinted in 11 T he
Papers of Ttiomas J efferson 49 (Julian P. Boyd ed.. 1955) (“The way to prevent these irregular
interpositions of the people is to give them full information of their affairs thro’ the channel of
the public papers, and to contrive that those papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people.
The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to
keep that right. . . .”).
227. Fed. Depository L ibrary Program, Designation Handbook for F ederal
Depository Libraries 7 (2008), https://permanenl.access.gpo.gov/lpsl00554/designationhandbook.pdf.
228. A Brief History o f the FDLP, F e d . DEPOSITORY I.IBR. PROGRAM (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://www.fdlp.gov/about-fdlp/mission-hislory/a-brief-history-of-the-fdlp.
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Government Publishing Office (then the Government Printing Office;
GPO) in 1860,229 and in 1895 Congress passed the Printing Act,230 which
altered the responsibilities o f the GPO and created the FDLP. The law
centralized government printing, which had previously been hired out to
private printing firms, and provided a detailed outline o f documents to be
published and how each was to be distributed.231 For the more
consequential records, like newly passed statutes, “distribution to State
and Territorial libraries and to the designated depositories” was called
for.232 The new law was meticulous in defining GPO resources and their
acquisition, but granted the new bureau great latitude in determining the
policies o f government information. A first responsibility, though, was
distributing eleven congressional documents to the 420 newly designated
depository libraries.233 In 1962, Congress established the present-day
iteration of the FDLP, also formally recognizing its name.234 Another law
was passed in 1993, effectively moving the depository library system
online.23'’ The new law required the digitization and online availability of
the Congressional Record and the Federal Register, among other records,
and functioned as a digital repository for important government
information.236
As it exists today, the FDLP237 consists o f 1141 depository libraries
in the United States and its territories. Each library is required to hold a
“basic collection” o f “vital sources o f information that support the
public’s right to know about the workings and essential activities o f the
Federal Government.”238 The basic collection includes census
229. S.J. Res. 25, 36th Cong. (1860).
230. Act Providing for the Public Printing and Binding and the Distribution o f Public
Documents, ch. 23, 28 Stat. 601 (1895).
231. Id. at 613 (“O f the Report ofthe Bureau of Animal Industry, thirty thousand copies, of
which seven thousand shall be for the Senate, fourteen thousand for the House, and nine thousand
for distribution by the Agricultural Department.”).
232. Id. at 615.
233. A B rief History o f the FDLP, supra note 228.
234. Depository Library Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-579, 76 Stat. 352.
235. Government Printing Office Electronic Information Access Enhancement Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-40, 107 Stat. 112.
236. Id.
237. 44U.S.C. fjij 1901-1916 (2012).
238. FDLP Basic Collection, F e d . D epo sitory L ib r . P ro g r a m (last updated Sept.
14, 2018), https://www.fdlp.gOv/requircments-guidance/colleclions-and-databases/l442-basiccollection (stating that the twenty-one resources are: American FactFinder, Assistance Listings,
Ben’s Guide to the U.S. Government, Budget ofthe United States Government, Catalog o f U.S.
Government Publications, Code of Federal Regulations, Compilation of Presidential Documents,
Congressional Record, Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation,
Economic Indicators, Economic Report of the President to the Congress, Federal Register,
Govinfo, Occupational Outlook Handbook, Official Congressional Directory, Public Papers of
the Presidents of the United States, Social Security Handbook, United States Code, United States
Government Manual, United States Reports, and United States Statutes at Large).
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information, a current federal budget, the Federal Register, an up-to-date
United States Code, a Social Security guide and an occupational outlook
guide, among many others. There are optional secondary sources and
expectations regarding regional libraries providing local information.239
Many o f the texts and records are no longer held as print copies and are
only available online. The collections are unique to each library and
evolve often and the medium or format o f the information has changed
as well. But the premise remains the same; to keep the common citizen
apprised and current o f government activity.
The FDLP stands as an unalloyed commitment to affirmative
disclosure. During the 19th century, the federal government, at no little
expense or effort, ensured citizens had access to information. It required
a coordinated effort o f printing and delivery across undeveloped terrain
and demonstrates the federal insistence in the program. The libraries live
on, though their stature is diminished, but they exist as a testament to an
early and enduring U.S. belief in access.
B. Affirmative Disclosure & FOIA
Since enactment, the FOIA has included two unheralded clauses
necessitating proactive disclosure, and the 1996 EFOIA amendments240
made a concerted effort to embrace the possibilities of digital records.
The advent o f computer use began in earnest in the 1980s, but
government adoption and practices varied considerably. In the 1990s,
computer use in the government grew exponentially, but access to digital
records was hardly a concern in the development o f government
computer systems. 1The EFOIA amendments were a formal recognition
o f the digital revolution and the possibilities o f the Internet. They
instituted important changes in the FOIA, including officially folding all
digital records into the domain o f the FOIA and allowing requesters to
dictate the format o f the delivered record.242 Electronic Reading Rooms
were also established as part o f the amendments, requiring all federal
agencies to make an online space for the affirmative disclosure o f four
types o f agency records and information, including a requirement for
agencies to post online any record released as part o f any other request.243

239. Depository Collection and Development. Fed . DEPOSITORY LlBR. PROGRAM (last
updated Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.fdlp.gov/requirements-guidance/guidance/14-depositorycollection-and-development#basic-collection.
240. Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048.
241. Matthew D. Bunker, Sigman L. Splichal, Bill F. Chamberlin & Linda M. Perry, Access
to Government-Held Information in the Computer Age: Applying Legal Doctrine to Emerging
Technology, 20 Fla. St . U. L. Rev . 543, 559-60 (1993).
242. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(B) (2016).
243. Id. ij 552(a)(2)(D) (requiring online publication of “all records, regardless of form or
format that have been released to any person [who made a specific request therefore] and that
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These efforts were meant to modernize the FOIA and dramatically
increase the amount of information disclosed by agencies. They represent
a sea change in government disposition, marking a new initiative in
disseminating more information to the public. Significantly, it required
no request from citizens and was a headlong embrace o f digital
affordances. The general outlook was sanguine. It was thought the
amendments would decrease the cost of FOIA administration while
ushering in a new digital era o f government transparency.
It is hard to overstate the enthusiasm surrounding the EFOIA
amendments. Contemporaneous scholars believed the EFOIA
amendments would have a seismic impact on public access to
government records. Michael Tankersley suggested it marked a move
away from the requester release system to a more transparency-friendly
affirmative disclosure regime.244 He was unabashed in his excitement,
noting that despite a lack o f fanfare the efforts signaled “a revolutionary
shift.”24j If Congress provided adequate resources and could ensure
agency support o f the new affirmative disclosure policies, Tankersley
believed the very meaning o f public access would change.246 James
O ’Reilly shared the belief that the EFOIA amendments would represent
a paradigmatic change in government transparency.247 However, he
warned o f the threat o f too much availability and was concerned about
access to private information. The amendments presented the possibility
of changing the FOIA law’s purpose “from a window for oversight o f the
actions o f government into a library o f resources about others.”248
O ’Reilly believed the 1996 alterations presented the possibility o f having

because o f the nature of their subject matter, the agency determines have become or are likely to
become the subject o f subsequent requests for substantially the same records.”).
244. Michael E. Tankersley, How the Electronic Freedom o f Information Act Amendments
o f 1996 Update Public Access fo r the Information Age, 50 Admin. L. Rev. 421, 422-23 (1998)
(“The 1996 Amendments shift the emphasis away from [the] ‘request-and-wait’ model. The new
paradigm requires agencies to anticipate requests and make broad categories of records
immediately available to the public at agency records depositories and, using telecommunications
technology, at requesters’ home computers. . . . The new model for public access requires that
agencies be more forthcoming in making records immediately accessible to the public, and that
requesters be more sophisticated in locating records and fashioning requests.”).
245. Id. at 423.
246. Id. at 458 (“ The success of these Amendments will depend on whether agencies
embrace or resist this new paradigm . . . . In order for these Amendments to be implemented, the
government must make a broader commitment to devoting resources to providing information to
the public than it has in the past. . . . For both agencies and requesters, Congress’s decision to
emphasize the use of new technologies and shift FOIA away from the traditional ‘request-andwait-’ procedures will change the meaning of public access under FOIA.”).
247. James T. O’Reilly, Expanding the Purpose o f Federal Records Access: New Private
Entitlement or New Threat to Privacy?, 50 A d m in . L. R e v . 371, 374 (1998) (“This will create a
very different landscape of FOIA utilization in the coming years.”).
248. Id. at 376.
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gone too far in embracing digital affordances and opening up the
government.
Despite the grand ambitions o f the EFOIA, after more than twenty
years of the alterations, little has changed in the prevailing FOIA routines,
and the sea change predicted by Tankersley and O ’Reilly has failed to
materialize. In analyzing FOIA annual report data, the general
administration of the FOIA remains largely unchanged. Backlogs
fluctuate, exemptions grow and shrink in popularity and the reporting
requirements have expanded, yet the data documents very similar trends.
Anecdotal reports demonstrate continued consternation from
requesters.249 An audit o f the EFOIA’s implementation mirrored
amendments failure to affect change.210 A 2007 study o f 149 federal
agencies found about one in five agencies were fully compliant with the
explicit requirements o f the 1996 amendments.211 Only six percent had
the required FOIA guidance to help requesters,212 and about one-third
provided the requisite records indices.213 The open government survey
concluded “that not only did the agencies ignore Congress, but lack of
interest in FOIA programs is so high that many agencies have failed even
to keep their FOIA Web sites on par with their general agency Web sites.
Congress’s best intentions have not had the desired impact.”254
One unrealized and overlooked provision o f the EFOIA amendments
required agencies to present indices o f agency records and an aid for
locating records.255 The premise behind the indices and aids was to help
dissolve some o f the mystery o f the requester-release system, what
Schwartz called the requester’s paradox. A map o f records repositories is

249. See, e.g.. Dave Maass, Aaron Mackey & Camille Fischer, The Follies 2018, Elec.
F rontier Found. (Mar. 11,2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/foilies-20l8; Delayed,
Denied, Dismissed: Failures on the FOIA Front, ProP ublica (July 21, 2016, 8.01 AM),
htlps://www.propublica.org/article/delaycd-denicd-dismissed-failures-on-the-foia-front; Angus
Loten, FBI Blocking FOIA Requests with Aging IT, Lawsuit Alleges, W all St . J. (July 22, 2016,
5:14 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2016/07/22/fbi-blocking-foia-requests-with-aging-it-lawsuit
-alleges/; Tom Blanton, America Classifies Way Too Much Information—And We Are All Less
Safe fo r It, Wash. Post (July 31, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-unitedstates-is-not-safer-whcn-its-citizens-are-left-in-the-dark/2015/07/3 l/641b53fa-36e2-l Ie5-b673Idl005a0fb28 story.html?utm_term=.4badfecd5fl3; Federal Agencies Stiff-Arm FOIA Requests,
USA T oday (Mar. 15, 2015, 8:06 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/03/15/
sunshinc-week-foia-government-transparcney-editorials-debates/24823085/.
250. See, e.g., Kwoka. supra note 98, at 1430 (“The success of the E-F01A provisions... has
been generally regarded as extremely limited because of agencies’ implementation failures.”).
251. N at’l Sec . Archive, File Not Found: 10 Y ears A fter E-F01A, Most Federal
Agencies A re Delinquent 7 (2007), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB216/
index.htm.
252. Id. at 15.
253. Id. at 13.
254. Id. at 1.
255. 5 U.S.C. § 552(g) (2016).
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subtly radical, chipping away at the wall separating the public and the
government and presenting a half-measure in affirmative disclosure.
Knowledge o f agency records hierarchies cedes a small amount o f control
to individuals, giving citizens an opportunity to better craft requests and
a better chance at appeal. It does not allow the public into the walled
garden o f government information, but - in theory - providing a glimpse
of what records exist. The indices exist only hypothetically though, as the
National Security Archive documented. Agencies have largely
disregarded the requirement, and no enforcement mechanism has ever
materialized.
The Obama administration famously added to the proactive disclosure
efforts introducing its own transparency initiative, commonly called
Open Government, early in the president’s first term.256 President
Obama’s original memorandum declared, “The presumption o f
disclosure also means that agencies should take affirmative steps to make
information public. They should not wait for specific requests from the
public.”2?7 Attorney General Eric Holder followed up with a
memorandum o f his own, in which he announced that “agencies should
readily and systematically post information online in advance o f any
public request. Providing more information online reduces the need for
individualized requests and may help reduce existing backlogs.”258
A new transparency plan was initiated with the 2009 Open
Government Directive, which highlighted three principles: transparency,
participation and collaboration.2 9 The document emphasized proactive
disclosure, requiring a range o f digital protocols including creating
dedicated webpages for easy access to agency records and information
and the online publication o f “at least three high-value data sets.”260
Generally, the Open Government effort focused on ensuring more data is
easily accessible to the public and in doing so pushing more o f the records
out to the public without public entreaty. “As one observer has written,
the basic thrust o f EFOIA was to shift from a system in which requesters
endure lengthy delays while waiting for paper copies o f records ‘to a
model in which agencies anticipate requests and act to make records (and
256. Memorandum o f January 21, 2009— Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,683,
4,683 (Jan. 26, 2009).
257. Id.
258. Attorney General’s Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
Concerning the Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 51,879, 51,881 (Oct. 8, 2009).
259. Memorandum from Peter R. Orzag, Director o f the Office o f Management and Budget,
for the Heads o f Executive Departments and Agencies Concerning the Open Government
Directive 1 (Dec. 8, 2009) (on file with the Treasury Dep’t).
260. Id. at 2, 7-8 (defining high-value data as “information that can be used to increase
agency accountability and responsiveness; improve public knowledge of the agency and its
operation; further the core mission of the agency; create economic opportunity; or respond to need
and demand as identified through public consultation.”).
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information on how to find additional records) available over online
systems.’”261 The results o f the new policies were checkered,262 but a
clear step in advancing proactive disclosure policies.263
The Office o f Information Policy (OIP), a Justice Department bureau
responsible for FOIA oversight, has further explored expanding existing
requester release. They have proposed increasing proactive disclosure
efforts as an extension o f the FOIA and under the authority as established
with FOIA’s original passage. In July 2015, the OIP commenced a sixmonth pilot study formally testing broadened proactive disclosure
practices with seven executive agencies and offices.264 One o f the
primary policies examined was “release to one is release to all,” where a
single request for a record results in that record being posted to the
agency’s website for all to access.265 Assessment called the proactive
disclosure policies a success with a number o f the agencies voluntarily
continuing the practices once the study ended, including the
Environmental Protection Agency, the National Archives and Records
Administration and multiple divisions of the Defense Department.266 One
o f the biggest challenges to proactive disclosure was compliance with
Section 508 o f the Rehabilitation Act that requires material posted to the
Internet to be accessible to those with disabilities.267 The OIP ultimately
found there to be an inherent value in making records available to all and
that proactive disclosure policies would likely reduce traditional FOIA
workload,26* concluding that demand for increased proactive disclosure
and use o f available information will likely grow as policies become more
engrained and popular.

261. Michael llerz, Law Lags Behind: FOIA and Affirmative Disclosure o f Information, 7
C ardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 577, 588 (2009) (citing Michael Tankerslcy, Opening
Drawers: A Requester’s Guide to the FAectronic Freedom o f Information Act Amendments, LEGAL
T imes, May 19. 1997, at 29).
262. See Russell L. Weaver, President Obama's Open Government Initiative, 1 Int’l J.O pen
G ov ’ts 1, 2 (2014); Beth S. Noveck, Rights-Based and Tech-Driven: Open Data, Freedom o f
Information, and the Future o f Government Transparency, 19 Yale Hum . Rts . & D ev. L.J. 1, 5 6 (2017); Matthew Crain, The Limits o f Transparency: Data Brokers and Commodification, 20
N ew M edia & Soc ’y 88, 89 (2016).
263. Palrice McDermott, Building Open Government, 27 Gov ’t Info. Q. 401, 402 (2010)
(noting “high value” datasets amounted to more than 100,000 by March 2010, though their value
was a “mixed bag.”).
264. Proactive Disclosure Pilot Launches, D ep’t OF JUSTICE (July 10, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/proactive-disclosure-pilot-launehes.
265. U.S. Dep ’t of J ustice, P roactive D isclosure P ilot A ssessment 3 (2016).
266. Id. at 16-17.
267. Id. at 4.
268. Id. at 19 (“Ifeven one requester can find what he or she is looking for by reviewing the
records already processed for the release to someone else, that would be one less FOIA request
that needs to be made and one less FOIA request that an agency need receive.”).
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Most notable among recent government efforts regarding proactive
disclosure is the recent amendment to the FOIA.269 The 114th Congress
further refined the proactive disclosure section o f the statute,270 as well
as the FRA.271 The FOIA Improvement Act o f 2016 formally endorsed
affirmative disclosure through an amendment to the FRA that requires
agencies to have “procedures for identifying records o f general interest
or use to the public that are appropriate for public disclosure, and for
posting such records in a publicly accessible electronic format.”272
In March 2018, the Department o f Justice announced the launch o f a
first iteration o f a centralized portal for federal FOIA requests.273 The
portal was built with the cooperation o f the Office o f Management and
Budget, as directed by the 2016 FOIA amendment.274 All agencies
subject to the FOIA have their request procedures and documents housed
at the federal portal. The effort represents clear steps in bringing order to
an often chaotic, decentralized requester release system but still fails to
address systemic issues inherent in the FOIA.
C. International Efforts
An intermediary step in developing a more transparent government is
building a public-facing records management system. A first step in this
process would be creating and publishing a register o f all records and
record metadata. In 1989, Canada took a very modest step in that
direction by establishing the Coordination o f Access to Information
Requests System (CAIRS) as an internal tracking protocol for the
country’s federal Access to Information Act (ATIA). 76 CAIRS acted as
a central register of Canadian ATIA requests. The CAIRS system itself
became a frequent subject of ATIA requests with users mining it for
statistical studies of transparency and in an effort to refine future
requests.276 Nearly all ATIA activity became available after a database
was built o f the resulting CAIRS info, allowing individuals to peruse the
wording o f requests, dates, departments and unique identifiers.277 Despite
claims that the Canadian government was working on publishing an
269. FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114—185, 130 Stat. 538.
270. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D)(ii)(II) (2016) (encoding the “rule of three,” where agencies are
obligated to post online any records that have been requested three or more times).
271. 44 U.S.C. § 3102 (2016).
272. Id.
273. Department o f Justice Announces Launch o f National FOIA Portal, U.S. Dep’t OF
J ustice (Mar. 8, 2018), /!rtps://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-launchnational-foia-porlal.
274. FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 § 2.
275. Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-l.
276. Tories Kill Access to Information Database, CBC N ews (May 2, 2008, 9:23 PM),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/tories-kill-access-to-information-database-l.705430.
277. Id.
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ATIA register on its own and make general improvements on the law,
critics have suggested the government is not interested in providing
access to a register like CAIRS or enacting substantive change in the
statute.278 Alasdair Roberts expressed enthusiasm with the prospect of
proactive disclosure o f the metadata on all federal records: “Even
rudimentary information about the volume and subject o f newly
generated documents might reveal secrets about agency priorities.”279 A
one-time request under the Canadian ATIA to a single agency returned
enough metadata to determine the “emerging priorities” o f the small
government unit.280 Roberts observed that not only do government
objectives come to light, but it also expedites the requesting process by
allowing individuals to choose from the menu o f available records by its
unique identifier and simultaneously cutting back on fishing
expeditions.281 CAIRS was shuttered in 2008 after the government
determined it to be excessively costly and problematic.282 A spokesman
for the Treasury Board, the government division responsible for ATIA
oversight, explained the register was intended to be an internal tool, and
its accidental public nature caused a range o f issues for government and
individuals alike.283 Even if it was unintentional, the CAIRS system
represents an early effort in public-facing records management. More
interesting though was the civic interest in the mechanism, collectively
bootstrapping a nearly comprehensive look at Canada access to records
management.
Open government policies have gained global traction as well with a
number o f initiatives established, many aimed at the broader goal o f
freeing data. The International Open Data Charter is one such effort that
has found broad support. The charter’s stated objective is to “embed a
culture and practice o f openness in governments in ways that are resilient
to change through opening up data.”284 The first principle o f the charter
explicitly calls for “open by default,” whereby all government
278. Nina Corfu, Overhaul o f Canada's Access to Information Act Taking Too Long, Critic
Says, CBCN ews (Apr. 6, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/acccssto-information-act-changes-overhaul-promised-libcrals-federal-government-1.4056886; Gil
Shochat, The Dark Country, T he W alrus (Jan. 12,2010,4:21 PM), https://thewalrus.ca/the-darkcountry/.
279. A lasdair Roberts, Blacked Out : Government Secrecy in the Information Age
220-21 (2006).
280. W at 221.
281. W a t 222.
282. Brodie Fenlon, Harper Defends Database Shutdown, G lobe & Mail (May 5, 2008),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/ncws/national/harper-defends-database-shutdown/article
18449934/ (noting CAIRS “was deemed expensive, it was deemed to slow down the access to
information, and that’s why this government got rid of it.”).
283. Id.
284. Who We Are, O pen Data C harter, https://opendatacharter.net/who-we-are/ (last
visited Nov. 14, 2018).
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information is presumed available to the public and, according to the third
principle, is maintained in a central portal that necessitates clear
justifications for any information not released.
Among the more
granular o f the suggested practices is “consistent information lifecycle
management” to “ensure historical copies o f datasets are preserved,
archived, and kept accessible as long as they retain value.”286 The
International Open Data Charter was signed by all G8 leaders in June
20 13.287 As of 2015, 70 countries had agreed to the principles.288 A 2015
progress review awarded high marks to the United Kingdom, Canada and
the United States, as well as special commendation to Canada for
proactively publishing hundreds o f thousands o f previously unshared
datasets. 8 The report also produced recommendations, citing issues that
have plagued government transparency initiatives for decades. Technical
barriers were found to have been a burden, namely metadata issues and
licensing issues, but the primary impediments in realizing the Open Data
Charter principles were determined to be a lack o f political will and
public awareness o f the efforts.290
The International Modem Media Initiative (IMMI) was initially a
radical Icelandic effort to adopt a raft o f the world’s most progressive
speech and transparency laws and was unanimously passed as a
resolution by the Icelandic parliament in 2 0 10.291 After a dramatic
financial crash, followed by a WikiLeaks revelation o f banking and
financial malfeasance, the country rebooted the nation’s leadership and
demanded more accountability. 92 Most provocatively, the project
contained a passel o f anonymity, whistleblower, source and intermediary
protections that would have provided legal shelter for WikiLeaks-type
organizations.293 The heart o f the proposal though was transparencyoriented, looking to engraft in the country’s freedom o f information law
a strong affirmative disclosure mechanism that would require a central
registry o f documents held by government bodies.294 Any non-posted

285. Principles, Open Data C harter, https://opendatacharter.net/principles/ (last visited
Nov. 14, 2018).
286. Id.
287. Daniel Castro & T ravis Korte, O pen Data in the G8: A Review of P rogress on
the O pen Data Charter 3 (2015) (noting the G8 countries in 2013 included Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States).
288. Who We Are, supra note 284.
289. C astro & Korte, supra note 287, at 4-6.
290. Id. at 32.
291. IMM! Resolution: Iceland to Become International Transparency Haven, Int ’l
Modern Media Inst., https://en.immi.is/immi-resolution/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2018).
292. Bruce Sterling, The Icelandic Modern Media Initiative, Wired (Feb. 17, 2010, 9:44
AM), https://www.wired.com/2010/02/the-icelandic-modem-media-initiative/.
293. IMMI Resolution, supra note 291.
294. Id.
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document was to remain on the public registry with the reason for
nondisclosure and an estimated time of publication. Exemptions were to
be severely limited and hold expiration dates, and privacy was secondary
to the public interest. The registry was to have been live and contained
not only a ledger o f existing documents but the documents themselves.
The proposed system was to have been overseen by an information
minister independent o f the judiciary with binding execution and sanction
power. After the initial popularity and Western interest, the effort was
rebranded as the International Modern Media Initiative but lost political
purchase as Iceland struggled to regain financial stability, reseating the
political party complicit in the cratering of the economy .-47
D. Adopting Affirmative Disclosure
Implementing affirmative disclosure as a method for increased
government transparency offers a continuum o f possibilities. At present,
a range o f affirmative disclosure mechanisms exist, including provisions
in the FOIA, the FDLP and public notice. One possible path forward is
merely enhancing these existing instances. This would be a continuation
o f the federal government’s current efforts in slowly adopting affirmative
disclosure principles. On the other end of the spectrum is a dramatic
change in government transparency, in-line with Iceland’s proposal,
where digital records— the preponderance of government information—
are public on creation. This capitalizes on the affordances o f electronic
records and would truly institute a presumption o f openness.
A major consideration in the future of government transparency is the
existence and authority o f an ombudsperson. Federal judges have
acknowledged the limits of courts resolving access disputes .246
Introduction o f an independent oversight role has been suggested as a
method for mitigating the adversarial nature o f access to government
information .247 An ombudsperson would be especially important in an
affirmative disclosure system, as the lack of requests makes the program
especially reliant on internal compliance. In freedom o f information laws,
there is considerable variation in the ombuds role, but it generally
represents a non-judicial authority with, de minimis, a responsibility to

295. Iceland Vote: Centre-Right Opposition Wins Election, BBC N ews (Apr. 28, 2013),
htlp://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22320282 (noting that Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson
would move into the prime minister’s chair only to depart in the Panama Papers scandal).
296. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823-25 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
297. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits o f the Adversary System, 75
Colum . L. R ev. 845, 848 (1975) (“ The fear of government oppression, raised by the use of
management and quality control techniques to the exclusion or minimization of adversary
decisionmaking, can be neutralized if the people’s watchdog were to become a viable concept. In
this way, the ombuds| person] signals the start of a new tradition; expedited public decisionmaking
under the supervision of institutionalized external overseers of the system.”).
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resolve disputes between requesters and public bodies. Daxton Stewart
suggests, traditionally, ombuds have no formal enforcement authority
and instead rely on voluntary compliance with recommendations.298 This
has evolved though, and some have been given substantial power.
Ombudspersons have a long history in U.S. transparency measures,
and Mark Fenster has suggested the modem concept originated in the
United States in the 1960s, citing Flawaii’s creation o f the role.299 In
2007, the federal government created the Office o f Government
Information Services as an office o f NARA to offer “a non-exclusive
alternative to litigation.” 300 OGIS effectively operates as a FOIA ombuds
office, primarily acting as a channel for communication between
requesters and agencies but also making recommendations to Congress
and the president. Congress deemed the work o f OGIS “largely
successful”301and, in a sign o f confidence, expanded OGIS authority with
the 2016 FOIA amendments. Nonetheless, OGIS remains largely
impotent in enforcing FOIA. It holds no ability to investigate agency
action or compel disclosure. Its primary weapon is the issuance of
advisory opinions. Fenster has observed its impact to have been
modest.302 Stewart’s survey of three state ombuds positions found
flexible and impartial roles to be more effective and that an appropriate
goal is not merely serving as an alternative to litigation but creating a
culture o f knowledge and trust among all parties.303 Significantly,
favoritism— “citizen aide” is a common title— fails to resolve, and often
enflames, the culture o f conflict.304
There has been considerable experimentation with the ombudsperson
position in access to government information.305 Some have imbued an
individual with the authority of the position, while others have
established an oversight panel or committee.306 Defining the procedural
processes o f the committee— whether they can conduct investigations or
merely resolve disputes— and deciding who, if anybody, they are to
report to are major considerations in establishing the effectiveness o f the
role. Most important, though, is determining the formal authority o f the
298. Daxton R. Stewart, Evaluating Public Access Ombuds Programs: An Analysis o f the
Experiences o f Virginia, Iowa and Arizona in Creating and Implementing Ombuds Offices to
Handle Disputes Arising under Open Government Laws, 2012 J. D isp. Resol. 437, 439 (2012).
299. Mark Fenster, The Informational Ombudsman: Fixing Open Government by
Institutional Design, 2 Int’l J. O pen G ov ’ts 275, 279 (2015).
300. OPEN Government Act of2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524, 2529.
301. S. Rep. No. 114-4, at 3 (2015).
302. Fenster, supra note 299, at 294.
303. Stewart, supra note 298, at 501-02.
304. Id at 502.
305. See Harry Hammitt, M ediation W ithout L itigation 2 (2007).
306. See, e.g., C onn. G en . Stat. § 1-205 (2015) (showing Connecticut’s Freedom of
Information Commission comprises nine commissioners).
.
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ombudsperson. To realize an effective position capable o f enforcing the
law, the individual or committee needs investigatory authority, subpoena
power, substantial enforcement abilities and the ability to impose
penalties or punishments. The ombuds role also requires political
insulation and a charter defining its position in enforcing the statute. It is
a difficult office to commission, but given the latitude to independently
provide routine monitoring, randomized review and investigate
complaints is essential to any access program, but especially so to
affirmative disclosure.
1. Conservative Approach to Increasing Affirmative Disclosure
A conservative path forward in executing affirmative disclosure can
be realized expanding upon the on-going affirmative disclosure methods.
Two simple, easily attainable changes would produce significant
improvements in government transparency: (1) identifying more records
categories subject to affirmative disclosure, and (2) enforcing existing
public index requirements.
Both the FDLP and the FOIA have expanded the categories of
information required to be published. The EFOIA establishment of
electronic reading rooms, Obama’s directive calling on the release of
high-quality datasets and 2016’s codification o f release-for-one-releasefor-all all signal the government’s slow embrace o f affirmative
disclosure.307 These efforts can be accelerated by identifying more
categories of information to be disclosed regularly.
The OGIS provided instructive guidelines for conceptualizing what
these categories could be. In a 2018 report, OGIS produced a report of
recommendations for fostering successful affirmative disclosure
practices.308 The report proposed adopting an affirmative disclosure
policy for three sets of information, records that: (1) memorialize agency
actions, (2) provide original government-collected data and/or (3) are
frequently requested.309 OGIS pointed to the abundance o f affirmatively
disclosed information produced by agencies like the Bureau o f Labor
Statistics and the National Weather Service, observing that when
agencies view dissemination as part o f their mission they successfully
established the necessary procedures.310 Citizens and journalists alike
rely on quarterly labor reports and the daily release o f climate data, and
the agencies consistently, successfully meet these affirmative disclosure

307. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D) (2016).
308. Proposed Recommendation for Proactive Disclosure C riteria, Proactive
Disclosure Subcomm. (2018), https://www.archives.gov/files/proactive-disclosure-subcommitteecriteria-recommendation-passed.pdf.

309. Id. at 4-5.
310. Id. at 2-3.
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expectations. Increased affirmative disclosure begets a more robust,
routine and responsive affirmative disclosure regime.
Other laws have been passed that reengineer agency responsibilities
to include affirmative disclosure policies. The DATA Act o f 2014
requires the Department o f the Treasury and the Office o f Management
and Budget to post government spending figures on a dedicated
government website.311The National Environmental Policy Act included
responsibilities for federal agencies to prepare and release environmental
assessments and impact statements for any major federally funded
project.312 Federal laws oblige agencies to affirmatively disclose
information on a diverse array o f subjects, including federal emergency
plans,313 drinking water,314 insecticides,315 clean air standards316 and toxic
substances.317 Herz defined categories for the types o f information
already expected to be affirmatively released: (1) information about the
agency and its activities: (2) information about how to interact with the
agency; (3) information about the entities regulated by the agency; and
(4) information about the world.318 These laws represent a small sample
o f the many agencies that affirmatively disclose information, but
demonstrate how pervasive the practice is.
Two simple methods for determining more information ripe for
affirmative disclosure include performing an exhaustive search of
commonly requested categories o f information and an open public
comment period. For instance, individuals frequently request the tax
records o f non-profit organizations. These requests are generally granted
pro forma, as they rarely involve non-disclosable information. By
developing a public interface, these annual records could exist both in
government repositories and online. At present, private companies
request and post this information at a cost to the user. Margaret Kwoka
has demonstrated these information brokers to be an especially heavy
burden on FOIA resources.319 By recognizing the categories o f records
exploited by these types o f companies and developing the necessary
interface, agencies would rid themselves o f a considerable number of

311. DATA Act, Pub. L. No. 113-101, 128 Stat. 1146, 1148(2014).
312. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2015).
313. 42 U.S.C. § 11044(a) (2015).
314. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-l(b)(l)(B )(i)(l), 300j—4(g)(5) (2015).
315. 7 U.S.C. § 136i-l(a)(1), (b) (2015).
316. 42 U.S.C. ij 7414(a)(1)(A), (c) (2015).
317. 15 U.S.C. 1) 2607(b)(7) (2015).
318. Herz, supra note 110, at 579-81 (noting that another example of the third category
includes the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s comprehensive online posting of
work safety inspection; instances of the fourth category would be the release of car safety testing
and the EPA’s posting o f environmental testing).
319. Kwoka, supra note 98, at 1425-26.
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requests, while also better serving the public interest.320 Another method
for determining appropriate categories o f affirmative disclosure could be
revealed through analysis o f existing FOIA logs.321 Agencies could
produce the frequently sought records in advance of requests, preempting
the FOIA process, conserving resources and providing additional
access.322 Agencies could also hold semi-regular public comment periods
or allow individuals to make requests for reoccurring record releases.
This would present the possibility o f continuously expanding records
categories and keep affirmative disclosure flexible and responsive to
public interest.
A second element for quickly and easily adopting affirmative
disclosure is the enforcement o f existing record indices provisions.323
Providing the public with an understanding o f agency records expedites
the request process and reaffirms the appeals process. The release of
organizational information structures is the first step in ceding control of
more information, and maps o f record repositories are a small leap from
the more aggressive and transparency-forward registries o f records. The
process of developing and publishing hierarchies o f information and aids
to assist the public is relatively simple. Again, these requirements exist
in the present FOIA statute, and insisting they be produced should be
without controversy.
The two steps to conservatively increasing affirmative disclosure
require little in the way o f statutory change but would represent a
dramatic reconceptualization o f access to government information.
Government agencies already affirmatively disseminate vast quantities of
data. Much of the information is so ubiquitous as to be hardly noticeable.
The public assumes this information is public, and the agencies see it as
part o f their charter. Perhaps the largest failure o f the FOIA has been its
evolution as a galling obligation to be conducted in addition to agencies’
real work.324 If every agency conducted itself with access and
transparency at the forefront o f their operations, the public’s relationship
with the government could change rapidly. It could be as simple as
opening the door to more categories o f affirmative disclosure and a
commitment to publishing records indices.
2. Radical Approach to Increasing Affirmative Disclosure
The more radical recommendation for increased affirmative
disclosure proposes more intensity in applying the principles o f the
320. Id at 1432.
321. Id. at 1436.
322. Id. at 1434.
323. Id. at 1434-35.
324.
See S. Rep. N o . 104-272, at 15 (1996) (observing search should be thorough but not
interrupt an agency’s primary functions).
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conservative approach, not new tools. The proposition relies on the
presumption of openness, operationalizing it by making records publicly
available upon creation and posting these records to a live register. The
registers would hold a row for every created record, and the row would
include metadata on the record. The row would host the record unless it
was flagged for review. If review determined it to be not disclosable, the
row would state the exemption and an expiration date for the exemption.
Determinations about which records are subject to registry posting are
open for debate but exploring previous request logs and allowing public
petitions seem like practical starting points. Creating public-facing
records that appear online once saved to the computer is theoretically
frightening but technically possible. It is a radical hypothesis, but
proposes sapping agency control of their own records, as each iteration
of the information process provides potential opportunities for agency
intervention and secrecy. Much of FOIA’s failure resides in a lack of
agency will to carry out their duties. By removing custody of their
information as early as possible, the process becomes more difficult to
undermine.
Agency emails would make an ideal, if bold, foray into implementing
more affirmative disclosure. In addition to the very public failures in
processing the requests for Hillary Clinton’s emails, requests for agency
emails make up a sizeable portion of total requests, and a 2018 study
found that two in five agencies said they were unable or not required to
search for requests seeking specific emails.325 Twenty-six percent of the
agencies claimed the request for emails was either too broad or would
impose an undue burden on the agency.326 Converting the internal, but
presumably open, email accounts of government personnel to publicly
available, searchable record repositories would lift much of this burden
while making government communication more transparent instantly.327
Agency emails already exist in registries and creating a second public
facing iteration of each individual’s inbox would take minimal technical
development. The format would allow for easy withholding, when
necessary, by retaining the row position in a typical inbox and merely
redacting the necessary information (sender, subject and/or date), listing
the corresponding exemption and providing a date of expected release.
With regards to segregability, the body of an email could be redacted in
the same fashion of current FOIA requests, by blacking out the withheld
portions.

325. Lauren Harper, Nate Jones & Tom Blanton, Agencies Struggling to Respond to FOIA
Requests fo r Email, N at’l Sec. A rchive (Mar. 8, 2018), https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news-foiaaudit/foia/2018-03-08/agencies-struggling-respond-foia-requests-email.
326. Id.
327. See Kwoka, supra note 98, at 1431, 1434.
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The registries of live records may appear to be an unlikely application
yet represent a reality if Congress’s rhetoric and the presumption of
openness are to be believed. Access to government information is in a
deplorable position, constrained by a law from a paper-record era that’s
received a crabbed interpretation from federal courts. The law pits
requesters against agencies despite an incredible disadvantage in
information and resources. Live registries and default publication remove
responsibility from agencies that have undermined the function o f the
FOIA at every turn. Hillary Clinton’s email fiasco represents just another
cynical turn in the executive branch’s overt disregard for the law and the
public’s right to know. Putting agency personnel’s emails online would
be a line in the sand demonstrating, for the first time, the government is
sincere in its presumption o f openness.
C o n c l u s io n

To be sure, affirmative disclosure is not a panacea. ” It would not
cure all o f the ills of the FOIA. It may represent an early front in a
transparency war that may compel Congress to pass explicit laws
requiring public bodies avoid covert or encrypted messaging programs
and record memorial actions akin to provisions in federal open public
meeting laws necessitating agency business be conducted in a public
setting.'29 But affirmative disclosure represents a significant step forward
in delivering on the people’s right to know. It runs the risk o f
reconstituting some o f the problems o f the pre-FOIA transparency
mechanisms, assuming good faith from agencies in fulfilling the
affirmative disclosure o f the records, whether they be select categories or
the entirety o f their archives. It places a lot of responsibility with agencies
that have demonstrated an incredible reluctance to release records. The
proposed recommendations would also leave many of the issues plaguing
the FOIA in place. The use of registers and flagging o f non-disclosable
information allows agencies considerable authority in determining
excluded records, which would not be dissimilar from the existing
exemptions system. A strong, independent ombudsperson could alleviate
many of these concerns, but as addressed above, such an appointment
presents a range o f issues.
Just as passage of the FOIA marked a revolutionary change in the
conception o f the public’s relationship with government records and
328. See, e.g., Alasdair Roberts. A Great and Revolutionary Law? The First Four Years o f
India’s Right to Information Act, 70 Pub. A dmin . Rev. 925, 929 (2010) (examining India’s
exemplary freedom of information statute, including expansive proactive disclosure provisions
and finding that implementation substantially underperformed with regard to statutory
expectations, in particular, proactive disclosure: “Unfortunately, many public authorities have
neglected the RTIA’s proactive disclosure requirements.”).
329. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(b) (2018).
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information, adopting further affirmative disclosure will require a similar
recalibration. The first step in doing so is recognizing the United States’
enduring commitment to affirmative disclosure and the quiet ubiquity o f
these principles. Affirmative disclosure is enshrined in the Constitution
and is ingrained in daily lives in ways rarely considered. The second step
is galvanizing the righteous refrain o f the public’s right to know. Specific
sets o f federal agency records remain sequestered only through public
acquiescence and indifference. Passage o f the FOIA marked an important
success in access but has become shot through with loopholes, many o f
which have been recognized by federal courts. The blatant disregard o f
essential FOIA procedures by the State Department in the Clinton email
fiasco presents two overlooked but crippling failures of the FOIA. Further
implementation o f affirmative disclosure provides the architecture for
building off o f the FOIA’s foundation. It is easily amendable, as
affirmative disclosure elements already exist in the statute; technically
achievable and symbiotic in both shrinking agency resource needs and
increasing public access to government records.
Adopting strong affirmative disclosure measures, like those outlined
above, and following through on implementation and oversight,
confronts the “longstanding, systemic weaknesses” and would mark the
advent of a new paradigm in government transparency. The ultimate
objective— a presumption o f openness— remains unchanged, but
modernizing the architecture and refreshing public faith could manifest
government finally delivering on the objective adopted more than fifty
years ago.
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